^{Note 1 in page 208} The English Heroic Play (New York, 1903), pp. 114, 192.

^{Note 2 in page 208} Restoration Tragedy (Oxford, 1929), p. 21.

^{Note 3 in page 208} Restoration Drama, 1660–1700, 4th ed. (Cambridge, 1952), p. 84.

^{Note 4 in page 208} “Heroical Love in Dryden's Heroic Drama,” PMLA, lxxiii (December 1958), pp. 480–490.

^{Note 5 in page 208} “The Appeal of Dryden's Heroic Plays,” PMLA, lxxv (March 1960), pp. 37–45.

^{Note 6 in page 209} See Curtis Watson, Shakespeare and the Renaissance Concept of Honor (Princeton, New Jersey, 1960) for a thorough discussion of the concept of honor from the time of the classical humanists through the age of Shakespeare. He points out that Plato was ordinarily not used as an authority by the Renaissance humanists because, unlike Aristotle, Plato dissociated honor from virtue. He felt that the good man should do good because of a disinterested love of virtue and held in low esteem the acquisition of human honor in the sense of outward honor and praise (pp. 21–23). See also C. L. Barber, The Idea of Honour in English Drama, 1591–1700 (Göteborg, Sweden, 1957) for a helpful study of the seventeenth-century usage of the noun honour in the plays of the period indicated.

^{Note 7 in page 209} Robert Ashley's definition of honor in Of Honour, ed. Virgil B. Heltzel (San Marino, Calif., 1947), p. 34, carefully incorporates these ideas and is typical of many Renaissance definitions of honor.

^{Note 8 in page 209} The Morall Philosophy of the Stoicks, trans. Charles Cotton (London, 1664), p. 40.

^{Note 9 in page 209} Fame is sometimes used as a synonym for honor in the sense of recognition and reward of actual merit. Some writers, however, distinguish between fame and honor. William Cornwallis, for example, said that while honor is the reward of virtue, fame is the “tickling of applause” which is often not given to the virtuous but to “betrayers of vertue.” See “Of Trappes of Fame,” Essay 35, Essayes, ed. D. C. Allen (Baltimore, Md., 1946). Robert Ashley in Of Honour makes the same distinction (p. 37) as does Count Romei in The Courtiers Academie, trans. I. K. (London, 1598), p. 125.

^{Note 10 in page 209} The Maxims of Francis Guicciardini, trans. Emma Martin (London, 1846), Maxim 53, p. 59.

^{Note 11 in page 210} See the unpubl. diss. (Univ. of Chicago, 1925) by Virgil B. Heltzel, “Chesterfield and the Tradition of the Ideal Gentleman” (microfilm), p. 45.

^{Note 12 in page 210} Peter de La Primaudaye, The French Academie, trans. T. B., 3rd ed. (London, 1954), pp. 212, 220. See also James Cleland, The Institution of a Young Noble Man, i (New York, 1948), pp. 242–244.

^{Note 13 in page 210} The Courtiers Academie, trans. I. K. (London, 1598), p. 107.

^{Note 14 in page 211} The Ethics of Aristotle, ed. J. A. K. Thomson (London, 1953), Book IV, Chapter v, pp. 110–111.

^{Note 15 in page 211} A Discourse of Civill Life (London, 1606), p. 226.

^{Note 16 in page 211} The Book of the Courtier, ed. Ernest Rhys (London, 1928), p. 272.

^{Note 17 in page 211} See Maurice Valency, In Praise of Love (New York, 1958).

^{Note 18 in page 211} Ibid., pp. 6–18.

^{Note 19 in page 211} The Dialogues of Plato, trans. B. Jowett, I (London, 1871), p. 496.

^{Note 20 in page 212} Valency, pp. 15, 77–78.

^{Note 21 in page 212} Jefferson B. Fletcher, The Religion of Beauty in Woman (New York, 1911), pp. 32–38.

^{Note 22 in page 212} See Kathleen Lynch, The Social Mode of Restoration Comedy (New York, 1926), p. 46.

^{Note 23 in page 212} John Fletcher's The Loyal Subject (1618) deals with the extravagant tests to which the loyalty of General Archas is subjected.

^{Note 24 in page 212} All references to Dryden's plays in this paper are to the edition by Montague Summers, The Dramatic Works, 6 vols. (London, 1932–33). The heroic plays referred to in this paper are in vols. i, iii, iv.

^{Note 25 in page 213} Scott Osborn mistakenly ascribes this speech to Montezuma (p. 486).

^{Note 26 in page 213} The one time his anger tempts him to dispute with the sword his father's injustice to him, she beseeches him not to lose “the honour” he has won as “the blamless pattern of a son,” and immediately Aureng-Zebe sheaths his sword with the comment that his “virtue” had been surprised into crime.

^{Note 27 in page 214} The Countess of Pembroke's Arcadia, ed. H. Oskar Sommer (London, 1891), p. 304.

^{Note 28 in page 214} “Of Heroique Playes, An Essay,” prefaced to The Conquest of Granada, Part I. Dryden does not indicate that Achilles' defects in honor were plainly recognized as such (as were Prince Anaxius'). Tasso, however, though he made amply clear that wrath sometimes triumphed over reason in Rinaldo, did not unequivocally condemn Rinaldo in all of those instances in which his wrath induced him to defy his general Godfrey. See Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance (New York, 1950), pp. 578–591, for a discussion of Rinaldo as an example of the tendency to release honor from the restraints of reason.

^{Note 29 in page 214} See Herbert Wynford Hill, La Calprenède's Romances and the Restoration Drama (Univ. of Nevada Studies, 1910), Part I, pp. 14–15; Part ii, pp. 58–61. Artaban boasts unashamedly of his conquests, can inspire terror in his enemies by his mere presence, and in anger deserts to the Parthians when he quarrels with the Medes over the disposition of his captives.

^{Note 30 in page 215} In Aureng-Zebe, Melisanda speaks of Morat and Aureng-Zebe on the eve of their combat as “Too truly Tamurlain's Successors” (iii, p. 116), but Almanzor and Montezuma are much more like Tamburlaine than Aureng-Zebe, for they both have a towering arrogance which resembles Tamburlaine's, and they too at first obey no law but their own will.

^{Note 31 in page 215} Pierre Corneille's tragic heroes also refuse to submit to ordinary morality. See Cecil V. Deane, Dramatic Theory and the Rhymed Heroic Play (London, 1931), pp. 33–34. See also Haydn, pp. 577–598.

^{Note 32 in page 215} Almahide is only refining and developing the seeds of nobility which she perceived in him before he had even spoken to her directly. For she has pointed out to her slave Esperanza that there is “something roughly noble” in Almanzor, which, even in his “unfashion'd Nature,” looks divine (Pt. ii; iii, p. 53). Mr. Fujimura quotes this same passage to indicate that Almanzor, because he is of noble birth and has been brought up as nature's child, “possesses an innate dignity which all can perceive” (p. 45). Mr. Fujimura believes that Almanzor's character is patterned in part after notions of a cultural primitivism which depicts nature as essentially benign and good and that because his education has not been hampered by the conventions of civilized society, he possesses more naturally than men in civilized societies

“the two instincts that are strongest in man—-love and glory” (p. 45). Almanzor does indeed possess strong instinctive drives towards sex and glory. But what looks “divine” in him to Almahide is not his natural possession of these two basic instincts but the fact that he possesses an undeveloped capacity for self-transcendence in the use of these instincts. Only when he proves capable of fighting both for Boabdelin and for Almahide without hope of reward and with no resentment over Boabdelin's crimes against him does he become godlike in Almahide's opinion. For only then has he won an ascendance over sex and self-aggrandizement.

^{Note 33 in page 216} In the first shock, Almanzor not only believes the charge but asserts that his honor and his love have been more seriously affronted than Boabdelin's. Obviously, pride, anger, and the court of love belief that a lover's claims are superior to those of a husband govern his attitude here (iv. pp. 146–147).

^{Note 34 in page 217} See Mildred E. Hartsock, “Dryden's Plays: A Study in Ideas,” in Seventeenth Century Studies, Second Series, ed. Robert Shafer (Princeton, 1937) for an interesting though one-sided discussion of Hobbes's influence on Dryden's plays.

^{Note 35 in page 217} The Anatomy of Melancholy, ed. Floyd Dell and Paul Jordan-Smith (New York, 1938).

^{Note 36 in page 218} See Lawrence Babb, The Elizabethan Malady: A Study of Melancholia in English Literature (East Lansing, Mich., 1951).

^{Note 37 in page 218} See Chase, pp. 125–126. Chase does admit that those who disregard honor and give themselves up to love cannot escape a sense of guilt and seek to gloss it over by dwelling on the nobility of the passion which has enslaved them.

^{Note 38 in page 220} Incidentally, no Platonic lady is responsible for curing his love malady. Aureng-Zebe's “excellent goodness” and further revelations of Morat's treachery bring about his restoration to reason and virtue.

^{Note 39 in page 220} Acacis is as scrupulously hon⇛ble in his love for Orazia as he is in all his other relationships. When he realizes that he is Montezuma's rival for the love of Orazia, he insists that they fight an honorable duel to determine who will win her. But when Orazia interrupts the fight by declaring that she loves Montezuma, Acacis nobly decides to conquer his love. Bearing no grudges, he urges her to flee while she can. Though she refuses to leave her father and is again imprisoned and condemned to die, Acacis selflessly pleads for mercy for her and Montezuma, and in protest at their impending fate he stabs himself. As he dies, he salutes Montezuma as his friend and vows that in eternity there will be room for both of them to love Orazia since “there's no desire, / Where to enjoy is only to admire” (v, p. 241).