^{Note 1 in page 1073} Shakespeare and the Nature of Man (New York, 1943), pp. 48–49, 94.

^{Note 2 in page 1073} Shakespearean Tragedy (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1948), pp. 97–102.

^{Note 3 in page 1074} Hamlet: The Prince or the Poem? (Annual Shaks. Lecture Brit. Acad., 1942), p. 16. Note how opposite, however, to the pronouncement of G. Wilson Knight, that Hamlet “has seen the truth, not alone of Denmark, but of humanity, of the universe: and the truth is evil.... It is Hamlet who is right. . . and there is no fault in his logic” (The Wheel of Pire, Oxford Univ. Press, 1930, p. 31). Or to Peter Alexander's view: “Hamlet, is the most normal of Shakespeare's heroes; the man of unimpaired vision with an equally true discernment whatever side of our nature is in question” (Shakespeare's Life and Art, London, 1939, p. 161).

^{Note 4 in page 1074} The Hamlet of Shakespeare's Audience (Duke Univ. Press, 1938). Cf. Josef Wihan, Die Hamletfrage (Leipzig, 1921), p. 52: “Hamlet beurteilt die Welt nach Mafistaben, die er aus sich selbst geschôpft hat, nicht nach objectiven Mafistaben.”

^{Note 5 in page 1074} The King in Hamlet (Univ. of Texas Bulletin, 1918); Salvadore de Madariaga, On Hamlet (London, 1948), p. 82.

^{Note 6 in page 1074} “The Tragic Conflict in Hamlet,” RES, N.S.I (1950), 97–113.

^{Note 7 in page 1075} See Moody . Prior, “The Thought of Hamlet and the Modern Temper,” ELH, XV (1948), 262.

^{Note 8 in page 1076} A Sheaf of Papers (London, 1922), pp. 32–33.

^{Note 9 in page 1076} The Elizabethan World Picture (New York, 1944), pp. 1–6, 17, 60 ff. This is also Spencer's view, p. 1: “In the sixteenth century the combined elements of Aristotelianism, Platonism, Neo-Platonism, Stoicism, and Christianity were almost indistinguishably woven into a pattern which was universally agreed upon, and which, in its main outlines, was lite same as that of the Middle Ages.” As a corrective to this view, let me recommend Erwin Panofsky, “Renaissance and Renascences,” Kenyon Rev., vi (Spring 1944), and Ernst Cassirer, “Ficino's Place in Intellectual History,” JHI, vi (1945), 483–501. See also Basil Willey, The Seventeenth Century Background (London, 1934), pp. 8–9; my Marlowe's “Tamburlaine” (Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1941), pp. 26–49; Hiram Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance (New York, 1950), pp. 42–67, 334–341.

^{Note 10 in page 1076} Actually, what the description fits most nearly is not any major tradition in the Middle Ages but rather that heterodox circle of so-called “Christian Cabalists” that emerged with the Renaissance. See J. L. Blau, The Christian Interpretation of the Cabala in the Renaissance (Columbia Univ. Press, 1944).

^{Note 11 in page 1076} Hamlet Without Tears (Loras College Press, 1946), pp. 90 ff. Hamlet's faith has been regarded as Catholic also by S. A. Blackmore, S.J., The Riddles of Hamlet (Boston, 1917).

^{Note 12 in page 1077} Dos dramaiische Meislerwerk des Proteslanismus (Berlin, 1918).

^{Note 13 in page 1077} The Five Great Skeptical Dramas (London, 1896), p. 321.

^{Note 14 in page 1077} Hamlet Without Tears, pp. 70, 99. To save this interpretation Hamlet must be read as “mad” in the Prayer Scene (p. 55).

^{Note 15 in page 1077} Shakespeare (New York, 1936), p. 224.

^{Note 16 in page 1077} See, on the one hand, Alexander's “Hamlet: A Suggestion,” TLS, Oct. 1, 1931, p. 754; “Shakespeare's Punctuation,” TLS, Mar. 17, 1932, p. 195; RES, ix (1933), 79; “The Text of Hamlet,” RES, xii, 385–400; and The Annual Shakespeare Lecture of the British Academy, 1945. On the other hand, Wilson's The Manuscript of Shakespeare's “Hamlet” (New York, 1934), ii, 211–213; his edition of Hamlet (1936), pp. 175–176; and a review of Alexander's lecture, RES, xxiii (1947), 70–78.

^{Note 17 in page 1078} The exclamation point, interchangeable with the question mark in Elizabethan usage, is usually substituted by modern editors.

^{Note 18 in page 1079} Several scholars, lately, have adopted the Q² pointing, perhaps under Wilson's persuading—e.g., T. Spencer, p. 100; Semper, pp. 91–92; Moody Prior, p. 264; Max Deutsch-bein, “What is this Quintessence of Dust?” Shakespeare Jahrbuch, LXX (1934), 89–100; and R. C. Bald, ed. Hamlet (1946). But other editors have not yet abandoned F¹; and Wilson Knight has argued well in defense of its pointing, quite apart from Alexander's theory. See Knight's “Hamlet's Speech on Man,” an appendix to The Wheel of Fire, rev. ed. (London, 1949), pp. 332–343.

^{Note 19 in page 1080} The Character of Hamlet and Other Essays (Univ. N. Carolina Press, 1941), p. 182.

^{Note 20 in page 1080} Compendium Theologiae i.143, tr. Cyril Vollert (St. Louis, 1947), p. 153 (italics mine, here and in other quotations in my text).

^{Note 21 in page 1081} His oaths include also: “By 'r Lady,” “By the rood,” “By St. Patrick,” and “By my fay”; also “For God's love,” “God-a-mercy,” and “Pray God.” But they are every one surface without substance. Hamlet's language is hollow; he is the ancestor in more ways than one of T. S. Eliot's The Hollow Man.

^{Note 22 in page 1081} See Aquinas, Summa Theologica ii–ii.89.2–4.

^{Note 23 in page 1082} J. Q. Adams, “Some Notes on Hamlet,” MLN (Feb. 1913) points out that in the Pro cessus Propetorum of the Chester cycle Balaam visits the four corners of the stage, as does Hamlet (i.v. 148–182) in trying to find a place to swear. Each time Balaam (Num. xxiii–xxiv) found himself unable to utter his curse, and each time Balak suggested a removal of ground.

^{Note 24 in page 1082} Dignity of Man, Sec. 34, tr. Elizabeth Forbes, Renaissance Philosophy of Man (Chicago, 1948), p. 250.

^{Note 25 in page 1082} “The Greeks, who knew so much about grace, knew nothing about Grace,” G. G. Walsh, S.J., Medieval Humanism (New York, 1942), p. 11.

^{Note 26 in page 1083} Tr. Montgomery Belgion (London, 1940). Cf. M. C. D'Arcy, The Mind and Heart of Love (London, 1945), pp. 29–33.

^{Note 27 in page 1083} See S.T. ii-n.156.1; Supp. 42.3; 63.2. Augustine teaches that a true marriage may follow even adultery, if the husband of the first marriage be dead.

^{Note 28 in page 1084} “The Medieval Comic Spirit in the English Renaissance,” Adams Memorial Studies (Washington, 1948), p. 432.

^{Note 29 in page 1084} St. Thomas (London, 1933), p. 126.

^{Note 30 in page 1084} “Hamlet's Book,” Huntington Lib. Bull., vi (1934), 17–37.

^{Note 31 in page 1084} Sec. 40, as noted by Peter Whalley in 1748; and by Anders, Shakespeare's Books (1904), who calls attention to rephrasings of Plato in Cicero and Plutarch.

^{Note 32 in page 1084} M. H. Addington, “Shakespeare and Cicero,” & Q, CLXV (1933), 116–118.

^{Note 33 in page 1084} Susanne Türck, Shakespeare und Montaigne: ein Beitrag zur Hamlet-Frage (Berlin, 1930), pp. 88–89.

^{Note 34 in page 1084} Hardin Craig, developing a suggestion first made by Francis Douce.

^{Note 35 in page 1085} The Wheel of Fire, p. 36.

^{Note 36 in page 1085} For a thorough analysis of the revolution in the doctrine of man wrought by these Christian thinkers, see Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture (Oxford Univ. Press, 1944). See also F. R. Barry, Recovery of Man (New York, 1949), p. 15.

^{Note 37 in page 1086} Renaissance humanists did not hesitate to tamper with this Psalm. Whereas most medieval Latin versions read that God has made man “less (minus) than angels,” Sebastian Castellio has the line read: “And thou hast made him nearly God” (Atqui eum pro-pemodum Deum fecisti). See Biblia Sacra ex Sebastiani Castellionis interpretatione (Basle, 1551).

^{Note 38 in page 1086} On Immortality, Ch. xiv; Ren. Philos, of Man, p. 376.

^{Note 89 in page 1086} Jessop ed., p. 72. The non-Thomistic character of Donne's thought has been exposed by M. F. Moloney, John Donne: Bis Flight from Medievalism (Urbana, 1944), Ch. iv.

^{Note 40 in page 1086} Comm. in Conviv. Plat, ii.3 (tr. Jayne); and Plat. Theol. Iii,2 (tr. Burroughs, JEI, v).

^{Note 41 in page 1086} As T. Spencer notes, Shakespeare, pp. 5, 19.

^{Note 42 in page 1087} See n. 67, below.

^{Note 43 in page 1087} See my Marlowe's “Tamburlaine,” p. 75.

^{Note 44 in page 1087} Tillyard, World Picture, p. 61.

^{Note 46 in page 1087} Dignity of Man, 2–3, tr. Forbes, Ren. Philos, of Man, pp. 224–225.

^{Note 46 in page 1087} “Ficino and Pomponazzi on the Nature of Man in the Universe,” JHI, v (1944), 226.

^{Note 47 in page 1087} Dignity of Man, 4. Montaigne uses this metaphor of man in Essays ii.i. Has this any relevance to Hamlet's remark that he fares “of the chameleon's dish” (iii.ii.99)?

^{Note 48 in page 1088} Church History, viii (1939), 202–203.

^{Note 49 in page 1088} Plat. Theol. ix.6; xiv.3.

^{Note 50 in page 1088} Quoted by S. R. Jayne, ed. Ficino's Commentary on Plato's Symposium (Univ. Missouri, 1944), p. 26.

^{Note 51 in page 1088} Hamlet (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1934), p. 176.

^{Note 52 in page 1088} Wilson elsewhere admits the phrase states “the very essence of the Renaissance spirit”; and Deutschbein calls it Renaissance philosophy. Both critics quote Pico for comparison, Deutschbein noting that Pico teaches the apotheosis of man. But does such doctrine agree with Aquinas? Our critics are overlooking here an important clue to Hamlet's character.

^{Note 53 in page 1089} Cf. Hooker, Laws i.vi.

^{Note 54 in page 1089} See S.T. I.55.2; i. 75.7; i.76.5.

^{Note 55 in page 1089} Dignity of Man, 11, tr. Forbes, Ren. Philos, of Man, pp. 229–230.

^{Note 56 in page 1089} See Ren. Philos, of Man, pp. 385 ff.

^{Note 57 in page 1089} S.T. I.75.7. Man's soul is of a different species from an angel, “because the natural operations of the soul and of an angel are different.”

^{Note 58 in page 1089} Comm. in Convivium Platonis, iv.3, tr. Jayne.

^{Note 59 in page 1090} Plal. Theol. xin.3; Concerning the Mind, tr. J. Burroughs, Ren. Philos, of Man, pp. 199–202. See also Kristeller, The Philosophy of Marsilio Picino (New York, 1943), pp. 117-119.

^{Note 60 in page 1090} Dignity of Man, 1–4, tr. Forbes.

^{Note 61 in page 1090} See Secs. 5, 7, 16, 22, 32–33. Bembo has the same idea in Castiglione's Courtier, Bk. IV : man's soul “fleeth to couple herself with the nature of Angels, ... for being changed into an Angel, she understandeth all things that may be understood.”

^{Note 62 in page 1090} Semper, Hamlet, p. 91, citing S.T. 1.76.5. St. Thomas does not mean, however, as Hamlet's words suggest, that the human soul's power is unlimited. Regarding man's intellectual faculty, he elsewhere says (S.T. 1.86.2) that “our intellect cannot understand the infinite either actually or habitually” but only potentially. Ficino, however, holds that “by nature it is able to grasp universal Being itself.” See Ren. Philos, of Man, p. 200.

^{Note 63 in page 1091} J. . Johnstone, “The Classical Element in Shakespeare,” Catholic World, cvi (1917), 38 ff.; Montaigne, notably Essays, I, Ch. 40 (14 in Trechmann's edition) : “That the taste of good and evil depends, for a great part, upon the idea we form of them.” Parallel with Hamlet noted by Feis, Robertson, Tttrck, et al.

^{Note 64 in page 1092} Dignity of Man, 3–6; Commente ii.16.

^{Note 65 in page 1092} See tfere. Philos, of Man, pp. 191, 207–208; Kristeller, Ficino, pp. 394–396.

^{Note 66 in page 1092} On Immortality, Ch. i, Ren. Philos, of Man, p. 282.

^{Note 67 in page 1092} S.T. 1.75.3 ff. “Nor do we say,” Aquinas writes, “that there are two souls in one man, as James and other Syrians write—one, animal, by which the body is animated, and which is mingled with the blood; the other spiritual, which obeys the reason; [Here compare Hamlet : ‘blest are those Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled .. . ‘] but we say that it is one and the same soul in man which both gives life to the body by being united to it, and orders itself by its own reason” (S.T. 1.76.3). If there were several souls in the body, as Plato holds, what would contain them, Aquinas asks. Not the body certainly, for “it is rather the soul that contains the body and makes it one, than the reverse.” Therefore “the same essential form makes man an actual being, a body, a living being, an animal, and a man” (i.76.6).

^{Note 68 in page 1092} See Ernst Cassirer, Individuum and Kosmos in der Philosophie der Renaissance (Berlin, 1927), pp. 100–101.

^{Note 69 in page 1093} Not until 1676, however, although authorities in Rome were disturbed over this point when examining the Essays in 1582. See T. Spencer, Shakespeare, pp. 36–38. Shakespeare himself in The Tempest seems to reject Montaigne's theory of man in favor of Aristotle's; see J. E. Hankins, “Caliban the Bestial Man,” PMLA, LXII (1947), 793–801.

^{Note 70 in page 1093} Ren. Philos, of Man, p. 207.

^{Note 71 in page 1093} Dignity of Man, 5 and 18. We might contrast what Charles Péguy has God say: “Sleep is the friend of man .... Sleep is perhaps the most beautiful thing I have created .... And he who sleeps has a pure heart... He who doesn't sleep is unfaithful to Hope.” For laziness is not “so great a sin as unrest And despair and lack of confidence in me.” Basic Verities, tr. Julian Green (New York, 1943), pp. 209–211.

^{Note 72 in page 1094} Correspondence, ed. Ball, in, 276; quoted by T. O. Wedel, “The Philosophical Background of Gulliver's Travels,” SP, xiii (1926), 434–450.

^{Note 73 in page 1095} City of God xiv.ll. See also Cochrane, pp. 451–455.

^{Note 74 in page 1095} S.T. I-IÙ09.2; ii–ii.156.2-3. See also i–ii.113.

^{Note 75 in page 1095} Herschel Baker finds Pelagianism suggested by Renaissance thought even in Spenser and Milton: “After the Red Cross Knight has descended from the Mount of Contemplation, where he has achieved holiness of spirit, he is self-sufficient; and Guyon, having learned to fortify himself through temperance, has no real need of Arthur's aid. As the Guardian Spirit says in Comus, if a mortal is truly virtuous he needs no divine assistance.” The Dignity of Man (Harvard Univ. Press, 1947), p. 245.

^{Note 76 in page 1095} G. B. Gelli, Circe, tr. H. Layng (1744), p. 251, as cited by R. C. Bald, “Edmund.and Renaissance Free Thought,” Adams Memorial Studies, p. 341.

^{Note 77 in page 1097} It is worth noting that Richard Overton, the Leveller, appealed to this quotation in La mortalité de l'homme (1643), Ch. iii, as proof of his mortalist theories, which Saurat believes influenced Milton. Overton held further, like Montaigne, that between animals and man there is a difference only of degree in that which concerns the intellectual qualities. See D. Saurat, Milton et le matérialisme chrétien en Angleterre (Paris, 1928), pp. 58–59. But Art. 40 of the Anglican Forty-Two Articles (1553) denies: a) that souls of the departed die with the body; and b) that they sleep without consciousness in the grave. The latter notion (soul-sleep) had been held by Luther; it is suggested by Hamlet as the “consummation devoutly to be wished.”

^{Note 78 in page 1097} S.T. 1.75.6. Luther's interpretation, by comparison, is that Solomon has been speaking “of the houre of death, not of the kinde”; or of “things under the sunne,” not of things “beyond the sunne” (i.e., speaking of things as they are perceived by reason, not of things as they are known by Revelation which is beyond reason). See his An Exposition of Solomons Boohe called Ecclesiasles (London, 1573), p. 60.

^{Note 79 in page 1098} Benjamin Boyce, “The Stoic Consolatio and Shakespeare,” PMLA, ixiv (1949), 771–780, offers many Stoic sources for Hamlet's reply, but produces nothing from Stoic writers to parallel Gertrude's “passing through nature to eternity.”

^{Note 80 in page 1098} “Lucian in the Grave-Scene of Hamlet,” PQ, ii (1923), 132–141.

^{Note 81 in page 1099} Dialogues of the Dead, 1.3.333–334; xviii.1.409, cited by Fox. My italics.

^{Note 82 in page 1099} Essays ii.12 (Apology for Raimond Sabunde). Montaigne's apology is actually an attack on the heretical optimism of Sabunde's Natural Theology—as T. Spencer notes, “Hamlet and the Nature of Reality,” ELH, v (1938), 261–262.

^{Note 83 in page 1100} Essays, II.12, Florio's trans., cited in Montaigne and Shakespeare (London, 1909), pp. 53–54.

^{Note 84 in page 1100} Essays, i.11, cited as a parallel by Robertson, also by S. Türck.

^{Note 85 in page 1101} Essays iii.8, Florio's tr., noted by Morley and quoted by Robertson, p. 43.

^{Note 86 in page 1101} S. Türck, p. 91; L. L. Schiicking, The Meaning of Hamlet (New York, 1937), p. 21; Hankins, Hamlet, p. 54, and Alice Harmon, “How Great was Shakespeare's Debt to Montaigne,” PMLA, lvii (1942), 998–999.

^{Note 87 in page 1101} See Cochrane, pp. 513–516. “

^{Note 88 in page 1101} E.g., Hankins, pp. 54, 177; Roy Walker, The Time is Out of Joint (London, 1948), p. 144. Walker goes so far as to say that “the decision to return to Elsinore is for Hamlet in his degree what the decision to go to Jerusalem was to Jesus” (p. 143).

^{Note 89 in page 1101} Shakespearean Tragedy (New York, 1937), p. 145.

^{Note 80 in page 1101} The Meaning of Hamlet, p. 167.

^{Note 91 in page 1102} Bede, History H.13; retold by Wordsworth, Ecc. Sonnets, xvi. The phrase “from whose bourne no traveller returns” places Hamlet also with Seneca. Stoll (Hamlet, p. 35) cites Here. Oet. 1527 and Here. Furens 856 as parallels.

^{Note 92 in page 1102} Essays, n.35 (p. 43 in Florio's tr., 1603).

^{Note 93 in page 1102} “Hamlet and the Modern Temper,” pp. 279–284. But advocacy of a “tranquillity” based on suspension of judgment and a yielding to instinctive feelings is found also in Montaigne. See Haydn, p. 91.

^{Note 94 in page 1103} Institutes iii.9.4; see also iv.xv.11–12; Zwingli, On the Providence of God, Ch. iv, ed. W. J. Hinke, Works, ii, 159 ff. For this theme in the Renaissance Neoplatonists, see my “Chapman and the Nature of Man,” ELE, xii, 90–91.

^{Note 95 in page 1103} E.g., Romans xi.16–18; James i.21.

^{Note 96 in page 1103} See, e.g., Against Two Letters, ii, 20; iii, 19. Also City of God xv.l: “each man, being derived from a condemned stock, is first of all born of Adam evil and carnal, and becomes good and spiritual only afterwards when he is engrafted into Christ by regeneration.” Augustine's optimism, in contrast to Hamlet's, can be easily illustrated: “Let the human race take hope and rediscover its own nature .... Menl do not despise yourselves—the Son of God assumed manhood. Women ! do not despise yourselves—the Son of God was born of a woman .... Do not be afraid of insults and crosses and death, for if these were harmful to man the human nature assumed by the Son of God would not have suffered them” (Christian Combat, Ch. xi, tr. R. P. Russell, New York, 1947). But Hamlet can only ask: “Who would fardels bear?”

^{Note 97 in page 1103} Session vi, Ch. xvi: “whereas Jesus Christ Himself continually infuses Bis virtue into the justified ... we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified to prevent their being accounted to have . . . fully satisfied the divine law.”

^{Note 98 in page 1103} See my “The Doctrine of Man in Calvin and in Renaissance Platonism,” JE I, ix (1948), 447–471.

^{Note 99 in page 1104} Question-begging, because legally the marriage is not incestuous, having been allowed by the council of Denmark; and because, morally, its incestuousness must be judged not by the fact of a physical love relationship with a brother's widow. (For the Church Fathers argue that Lot's so-called incest with his daughters was not morally incestuous under the circumstances; and on the ground of special circumstances it was argued by Renais-sance popes that a marriage to a brother's widow could be morally permissible [see Matthew xxii.24]—the very argument, no doubt, of the Council of Denmark.) Morally, the in-cestuousness of the marriage depends on the goodness or badness of the human purpose, on the judgment of the mil which undertakes it. To be incestuous the act must be contrary to God's will, not merely to the first husband's will and dignity. We happen to know that Claudius' marriage was contrary to both, but Hamlet doesn't: he never argues the former ground but is constantly invoking the latter (“Mother, you have my father much offended”). He calls the marriage “incestuous” on this ground even before he knows anything of the murder, in other words, before he has any evidence of the wickedness of Claudius' will, or suspicion of Gertrude's complicity in murder. The Church has never prohibited remarriage after the death of a first husband; in fact, speedy remarriage in such cases was encouraged in medieval times. Yet that is the very essence of Hamlet's complaint: Gertrude has married again, and so speedily! Nor does Hamlet complain that Gertrude has married a man too close akin, a brother (in other words, that she has violated the usual legal standard); he argues rather that she has married a man not-at-all akin in virtues and excellence, a stranger and outsider to the ideals Hamlet cherishes. But by Christian ethics it is a virtue to love the “stranger” and the “unworthy”; indeed, laws against marriage with too close of blood-kin are intended to insure love of the-person-who-is-different. The essence of “incest” is to love oneself, or someone else as the mirror of oneself. When the issue is thus penetrated, it will be seen that it is Hamlet who is essentially incestuous, much more so in any case than his mother, and even more than Claudius, whose primary flaw is greed rather than incest. Ernest Jones, though using Freudian rather than Christian tools of analysis, has been able to display clinically Hamlet's basic incest; see his Hamlet and Oedipus (London, 1949). But to return to the point which began this footnote: Hamlet's adjective “incestuous” is question-begging, because if Hamlet really wants to find the king when the latter is “incestuous,” why wait? Incest doesn't rest on repetition of the pleasures of the bed; the king's moral state is just as incestuous outside the bed! Catching him in bed won't prove him any worse. Morally his guilt lies hidden in his conscience (not Hamlet's conscience). And legally Hamlet has no grounds.

^{Note 100 in page 1105} Sleep is not sinful (S.T. ii–ii..153.2); drunkenness may be without sin, as in the case of Noah (S.T. ii–ii.150.1); anger is praiseworthy if in accord with reason (S.T. ii–ii..158.1–2); the pleasures of conjugal intercourse are not morally evil (S.T. i–ii.34.1; ii–ii.153.2) and the marriage act may in fact be meritorious (Supp. 41.4); there can be virtue in games (S.T. ii–ii.168.2); and swearing is in itself lawful, being a source of evil only when evil use is made of it (S.T. ii–ii..89r2).

^{Note 101 in page 1105} S.T. i-ii.88.1–2; 89.1. Hankins, p. 24, thinks the situations mentioned by Hamlet involve only venial sins.

^{Note 102 in page 1106} Quoted by Aquinas, S.T. ii–ii.151.1.

^{Note 103 in page 1107} Three Reformers (New York, 1936), pp. 54 ff.; The Dream of Descartes (New York, 1944), p. 179.

^{Note 104 in page 1107} Dream of Descartes, pp. 44-45. Or p. 176: the Method “constantly broke up the harmonies of philosophia perennis into two antinomic errors, each one disguising the other.”

^{Note 105 in page 1108} Jacob Feis, Shakespeare and Montaigne (London, 1884), p. 60. Feis thinks Shakespeare wrote Hamlet to warn his contemporaries against the “disturbing inconsistencies” of the philosophy of Montaigne. Feis, however, credits the inconsistency to an incomplete rationalism.

^{Note 106 in page 1108} See my Marlowe's “Tamburlaine,” pp. 34-36; also “Chapman,” ELE, xii, 100–106.

^{Note 107 in page 1108} “It was nominalism,” says Conrad Peplar, “that blessed the dichotomy between soul and body,” as a result of which man becomes “either an angel dependent on immediate revelation for every idea in his head, or a mere animal among the pleasures of the beasts.” See “Man in Medieval Thought,” The Thomist, xii (Apr. 1949), 154.

^{Note 108 in page 1108} The characteristics which Hiram Haydn finds in the “Counter-Renaissance”—aversion to the tyranny of reason, and a consequent pragmatism, relativism, trust in instinct, and insistence on first-hand experience—are all paralleled in today's Existentialism. Particularly in our own 20th century, from Bergson to Sartre we have seen an anti-intellectual reaction against the rationalism of liberal idealism epitomized in Hegel. I consider this a “reaction” rather than “revolution,” since the real revolutionary was Descartes, whom Hegel but develops in one direction, and the Existentialists in another. Similarly, I consider the “Counter-Renaissance,” which Haydn calls a “revolution,” to be actually a reaction against Florentine rationalism: Ficino and Pico staged the real “revolution.” Between their revolution and its reaction in scepticism, truth is split apart and pushed to opposite extremes. That is why both extremes are often found side by side—as Haydn himself recognizes in quoting many authors as examples both of “renaissance Humanism” and of “Counter-Humanism.”

^{Note 109 in page 1009} Conf. viii.21–22. Cf. City of God xrv.15.

^{Note 110 in page 1009} The Great God Brown iv.i.

^{Note 111 in page 1009} The End of Our Time, tr. Donald Atwater (New York, 1933). See also Jacques Maritain, True Humanism (New York, 1938). The epoch of Renaissance and Reformation produced “an anthropocentric rehabilitation of the creature,” he contends. The “radiating dissolution” of the Middle Ages brought to birth a civilization “that is not indeed wholly secular, but which, as it advances, severs itself more and more from the Incarnation” (p. 8). This anthropocentric humanism “merits the name of inhuman humanism” and “its dialectic must needs be regarded as the tragedy of humanism” (p. 20).

^{Note 112 in page 1110} On Hamlet, p. 34.

^{Note 113 in page 1110} L. Elliott Binns, The Reformation in England (London, 1937), p. 137.

^{Note 114 in page 1110} Haydn, The Counter-Renaissance, pp. 5–11.

^{Note 115 in page 1111} Stoll, Art and Artifice in Shakespeare, pp. 108–112, argues the non-existence of a tragic flaw in Hamlet. On the other hand, Bradley, Shakespearean Tragedy, p. 127, sees that Hamlet's story has fascination as “the symbol of a tragic mystery inherent in human nature”; but Bradley can not name the mystery.

^{Note 118 in page 1111} S.T. i-ii.82.1–2; 85.3. Aquinas' definition of original sin as “the langor of nature” suggests the fundamental melancholy from which Hamlet's melancholy can grow and be elaborated.

^{Note 117 in page 1111} On the Incarnation, 4–10; see Cochrane, p. 369.

^{Note 118 in page 1112} Cf. Jacques Maritain, True Humanism, p. 18: “In the Renaissance it was the cry of the creature's greatness, in the Reformation of its misery that went up to heaven.. .. The creature cried out for rehabilitation. . . . What is the significance of this demand? The creature was claiming the right of being loved.”

^{Note 119 in page 1112} G. F. Stedefeld suggested this eighty years ago: “Shakespeare in Hamlet shows us that the Christian view of God and the world has practical truth for life; his hero shows and teaches us in the end that without faith, hope, and love, no prosperity of life is possible.” Hamlet, ein Tendenz drama Shakespeares gegen die skeptische und Kosmopolitische Weltanschauung des Michael de Montaigne (Berlin, 1871), p. 35.

^{Note 120 in page 1113} Shakespeare's Philosophical Patterns (Baton Rouge, 1937), pp. 97–137. PMLA, LXI (1946), 1029–59.

^{Note 122 in page 1113} See my “The Ghost in Eamlel,” SP, xlviii (April 1951), 161–192.

^{Note 123 in page 1113} See The Hollow Man, Sec. 4.

^{Note 124 in page 1113} The Rock, chorus iii.