Published online by Cambridge University Press: 02 December 2020
A casual reading of the Pensées is apt to leave one with the conviction that Pascal held Montaigne in low esteem. When Montaigne's name appears, it is usually coupled with a word of disapproval. And yet, as everyone knows who has studied the sources of the Pensées, Pascal owes more to Montaigne than to any other writer. Nearly every one of the most famous fragments contains at least a passing allusion to the Essais, and many owe their whole idea, even their expression, to Montaigne. The editors have duly noted these debts, until, as Léon Brun-schvicg says, an edition of the Pensées becomes almost inevitably a partial reëdition of the Essais.1 Even in the matter of style, Montaigne seems to have exerted a considerable influence. It is evident, then, that Pascal read Montaigne carefully and extensively, that he was profoundly impressed by him, and that he saw much in him to admire. On the other hand it is equally evident, from the explicit criticisms, that he found Montaigne distasteful, even reprehensible. How can we explain this double attitude? The present paper is an attempt to do so.
1 Pensées de Pascal, “Grands écrivains de la France” (Paris: Hachette, 1904), i, Ixx.
2 The nearest approach to what we have in mind is probably in Léon Brunschvicg, Descartes et Pascal, lecteurs de Montaigne (New York-Paris: Brentano's, 1944). Judging by this title, one might think the present article only a duplication of Brunschvicg's work. This, however, is not true. He divides his book into three main parts, devoted to Montaigne, to Descartes, and to Pascal, and designed to give a fairly complete account of the philosophy of each. His numerous references from one to the other have, then, something of an incidental air. He does not systematically list Pascal's borrowings from Montaigne, or try to evaluate Pascal's opinion of Montaigne. His idea is rather to “préciser les termes du problème auquel la pensée française s'est attachée au sortir du Moyen-Age et d'en définir les caractères essentiels” (p. 16). My subject is more limited, and treated from a totally different point of view.
3 The references to the Pensées are to the numbered fragments in Brunschvicg's edition (see note 1).
4 The numbers in the text are page references to Pascal's own copy of Montaigne.
5 The references to the Essais are to book, chapter, and page of Pierre Villey, ed. Les Essais de Michel de Montaigne (Paris: Alcan, 1922–23). Each book of the Essais occupies one volume. In some other editions, including that used by Brunschvicg in his edition of the Pensées, Chap, xiv of Bk. i appears as Chap, xli; thus Brunschvicg's numbers for the intervening essays are different from those given here.
6 Others: False beauties in Cicero (II, x; ii, xxxi: 31). “Qu'on ne s'attende pas aux matières, mais à la façon que j'y donne” (ii, x: 22). Some speak well and write badly (i, x: 47). I write without order; my subject is not one that must have orderly treatment (iii, ix; iii, v:373).
7 What is worse than to be cowardly toward men, brave toward God? (ii, xviii: 194). It is speaking irreverently to say “God cannot die”, etc. (ii, xii: 84). Qu'il faut sobrement se mesler déjuger des ordonnances divines (i, xxxii: 853). There is a great difference between right belief and right conduct (iII, xii: 496). Some affect atheism simply to be different from others (II, xii: 194). Likewise, in Pascal's famous sentence, “Naturellement cela vous fera croire et vous abétira” (233), the use of the surprising (not to say shocking) word abétir is due to Montaigne: “Il nous faut abestir pour nous assagir, et nous esblouir pour nous guider” (n, xii, p. 220). Cf. Brunschvicg's note on the pensée, and also his comment in Descaries et Pascal, p. 199.
8 Also these: Which is better, marriage or chastity? (iii, i: 73). Nous ne goustons rien de pur (ii, xx : 385). Meditation is a pleasing and mighty occupation (iii, iii: 346).
9 Cf. pensée 183: “Nous courons sans souci dans le précipice, après que nous avons mis auelaue chose devant nous pour nous empécher de le voir.”
10 Others: Epaminondas combined great bravery with great kindness (ii, xxxvi; iii, i: 353). Bees have helped win battles (ii, xii: 367). It is not true that all criminals are equally criminal (ii, ii : 360). Some crimes require a kind of greatness of soul (iii, ix : 408). Universal judgments are worthless; to mean anything, one must be specific (iii, viii: 20). Astrologers (Pascal: eclipses) may safely predict evil, since evil is with us (iiI, ix; 173). The majesty of the heavens (ii, xii: 72).
11 Brunschvicg (Descartes et Pascal, p. IS) does speak of the Essais in these terms: “la profonde amertume de leur accent, dissimulée sous une affectation de nonchalance.” I think of Montaigne as perhaps disillusioned, but resigned rather than bitter. Pascal certainly did not find this bitterness in the Essais. He speaks, on the contrary, as we shall see, of Montaigne's philosophy as “naive, familière, plaisante, enjouée, et pour ainsi dire folâtre.” Would he use this language of a man whose nonchalance was, to him, only an affectation to cover an essential bitterness? I think that Pascal is more nearly right than Brunschvicg.
12 The Entretien is cited in the text of Joseph Bédier, in the Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France (1902), pp. 351–384. The present passage is on p. 379.
13 Ibid, p. 383.
14 Ibid., p. 384.