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The Value of Humanity by Nandi Theunissen (Oxford University Press, 2020).

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 April 2021

Abstract

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Type
Review
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021

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References

1 It does seem to strain the ordinary meaning of ‘good for’ to say that one's capacity is ‘good for’ or, especially, ‘benefits’ its exercise, but I ignore this in what follows.

2 To characterize Kant as holding that the good will is of supreme value because it ‘benefits us’ sounds precisely backwards – but that is only because those words normally suggest some further benefit, or good, than that which is contained simply in willing correctly. We can instead say: Given the sort of beings we are according to Kant – finite rational agents – the activity proper to us, and through which we are faring well, is that activity associated with the good will.