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Understanding a Primitive Society

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

H. O. Mounce
Affiliation:
University College of Swansea
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Extract

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In recent times Wittgenstein's work in logic has had an influence on other branches of philosophy. I am thinking, in particular, of social philosophy and the philosophy of religion. In these branches, Wittgenstein's followers have made much use of his notion of a language game. It has been argued, for example, that religion forms a language game of its own, having its own standards of reason, and is therefore not subject to criticism from outside. This argument has given rise to controversy, some seeing it as a subtle attempt by the religious to evade criticism. I have come myself to feel that the notion of a language game has been put to uses with which Wittgenstein himself might not have agreed, or, if he had, would have been wrong to do so. In order to explain what I mean I should like to look closely at the opening section of Peter Winch's article ‘Understanding a Primitive Society’.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1973

References

1 American Philosophical Quarterly, I, 1964, 307324.Google Scholar

2 The ‘cannot’, of course, is logical. I do not mean that if one tried one would fail, but that it would be senseless to try.

3 In writing this paper I have been helped by the discussions I have had with my colleagues in the philosophy department of the University College of Swansea. I want, in particular, to thank Mr C. Williamson and Mr M. Weston.