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Towards a Theory of Properties: Work in Progress on the Problem of Universals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

D. M. Armstrong
D. M. Armstrong
Affiliation:
University of Sydney
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Extract

Many philosophers have declared that everything which exists is a particular. There is a weak interpretation of this doctrine which I believe to be a true proposition, and a strong one which I believe to be false.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 50 , Issue 192 , April 1975 , pp. 145 - 155
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1975

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References

1 For one line of criticism of the various Nominalist positions (and also Platonic Realism) see my ‘Infinite Regress Arguments and the Problem of Universals’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 52, 1974 (December).Google Scholar

2 For development of the argument of this paragraph, and other matters in this paper, see my ‘Materialism, Properties and Predicates’, The Monist, 56, 1972, pp. 163–176.Google Scholar

3 McTaggart, J. McT. E., The Nature of Existence (Cambridge University Press), Vol. I, p. 63.Google Scholar