^{page 301 note 1} 520d, Jowett's trans.

^{page 301 note 2} I should say rather “Athenian,” since I do not propose to take notice of any philosophy except that of the Socratic, Platonic, and Aristotelian tradition.

^{page 302 note 1} τιειτ’, φη, δικσομεν αυτος, και ποισομεν ερον ζν, δυνατν ατος δν μεινον.

^{page 302 note 2} It is thus an exception to Professor Prichard's dictum (Duty and Interest, p. 10) that Plato implies “that it is impossible for any action to be really just, i.e. a duty, unless it is to the advantage of the agent.” Professor Prichard assumes that throughout the Republic the word δικαιος, when applied to actions, means “right” or “morally obligatory,” and he concludes Plato's doctrine to be that such actions are necessarily conducive to the agent's good. Granted his assumption, I think his conclusion would follow, provided only that he would except the passage now under consideration; but I would reject his assumption, and prefer to express the facts by saying that δικαιος; has not the meaning of “morally obligatory” in any passage of the Republic except this.

^{page 302 note 3} Cf. Prichard, , op. cit., pp. 12 ff.Google Scholar

^{page 305 note 1} From the passage quoted above.

^{page 305 note 2} 521b.

^{page 305 note 3} Cf. 521b: εις ον βον λλον τιν πολιτικν αρν καταφρονονται τον της αληθινς φιλοσοφας;

^{page 306 note 1} This does not mean that they are not willing members of it, but that consent is not a condition of their membership. Their willingness depends upon the formation in them of such a disposition ("Justice in the soul"), that they fulfil the law at last not against the grain. But the formation of this disposition is the result of life in the state, not vice versa.