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Self-evidence and Matter of Fact1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

The distinction tentatively drawn by Mr. Porteous at the last meeting of the Society between logical and causal necessity depends on the more general distinction between what is known or capable of being known as self-evident and what is known only as matter of fact. That there are three cows in a field is a matter of fact. That 1 + 2 = 3 is self-evident and necessarily true (if it is true at all). So soon as the question is raised it is seen that there can be no alternative to its being true—otherwise it is not self-evident. But there is no necessity that a field should have cows in it, or that if it has they should be just three in number. Similarly, it does not seem self-evident that an unsupported stone must fall to the ground.

Type
Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1934

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References

page 391 note 1 I also hold that real being is essentially incomplete and presupposes possible being. Both are equally essential to the universe of being.

page 391 note 2 I am not prepared to charge Husserl, himself with this, at least in the present stage of his development. Cf. Formale u. transzendentale Logik, p. 150.Google Scholar“Realitdt hat einen Seinsvorzug vor jeweder Irrealitdt (Idea, Essenz u.s.w), sofern alle Irrealitaten wesensmassig auf wirkliche oder mogliche Realitat zuruckbezogen sind.”

page 397 note 1 Principles of Logic, p. 247.

page 403 note 1 If I rely on my own judgment and not on the authority of experts.