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Respect For Persons as a Moral Principle—II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

W. G. Maclagan
W. G. Maclagan
Affiliation:
University of Glasgow
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Extract

In Part I of this discussion I considered the nature and validity of the principle of respect for persons as distinguished from its practical import and application. Before I proceed to that second topic let me draw together in summary fashion the main points of the view I have put forward.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 135 , October 1960 , pp. 289 - 305
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1960

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References

page 291 note 1 But see my article “Self and Others” in Philosophical Quarterly, April 1954, PP. 110–112.

page 292 note 1 The Analects of Confucius, trans. Soothill. Book II, Ch. 7.

page 294 note 1 “The Concept of Spiritual Heritage”, Confluence Vol. II, No. 3, p. 13.

page 294 note 2 “The chief good which the Christian lover will seek to realize for the loved is to make him also a lover (Rashdall, Conscience and Christ, p. 126.)

page 295 note 1 The Times, December 3, 1952.

page 296 note 1 Charles Morgan, in his essay “A Permissive Society”. Reflections in a Mirror, Second Series: p. 222.

page 299 note 1 Cf. D. D. Raphael, Moral Judgment, p. 130 (and Section 4 of his Chapter VII generally).

page 300 note 1 “How important is moral goodness?” Mind, April 1955.

page 303 note 1 Republic V, 459.