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The Refutation of Determinism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Extract
In his Christian Theology and Natural Science, E. L. Mascall refers to a criticism by Elizabeth Anscombe of C. S. Lewis's well-known argument against determinism that appears in his Miracles. Both Lewis's argument and Anscombe's response appeared originally as papers delivered in the 40s to the Oxford Socratic Club. A certain historical interest attaches to that exchange in that Lewis seems to have been ‘deeply disturbed’ by it.2 I think he need not have been. But, more importantly, the sequence of Lewis's article followed by Anscombe's reply and then Mascall's comments on both, provides a suggestive presentation and examination of a certain kind of argument against determinism. Essentially it is a negative rebuttal of a retortive kind, such as Aristotle uses against the sceptic in the Metaphysics. But its treatment by these three writers indicates a metaphysical insight that could possibly furnish a positive refutation of any kind of radical determinism.
- Type
- Research Article
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- Copyright
- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1984
References
1 Lewis, C. S., Miracles (London: Bles, 1947), 23–31.Google Scholar
2 Green, R. L. and W., Hooper, C. S. Lewis: A Biography (New York: Harcourt, 1974), 228.Google Scholar
3 Miracles, 27.
4 Op. cit. 26.
5 Loc. cit.
6 Op. cit. 27.
7 Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘A Reply to Mr C. S. Lewis's Argument that “Naturalism is Self-Refuting” ’, Socratic Digest No. 4 (1948), 11.Google Scholar
8 Op. cit. 12.
9 Mascall, E. L., Christian Theology and Natural Science (London: Longmans, 1957). 215.Google Scholar
10 Loc. cit.
11 Op. cit. 216.
12 B., Lonergan, ‘Metaphysics as Horizon’, Collection (New York: Herder, 1967), 207.Google Scholar
13 Op. cit. 208.