Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T21:34:03.728Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Professor Passmore on the Objectivity of History

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

I. C. Jarvie
I. C. Jarvie
Affiliation:
London School of Economics and Political Science.
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In his lucid paper “The Objectivity of History” (PHILOSOPHY, April 1958, pp. 97–111) Professor Pass more poses the problem of history's objectivity and seeks to find out in what the objectivity of history might consist. In this note I wish only to criticize his presentation of Popper's views (under his head Criterion Seven). I think Pass more's failure to report Popper's views correctly causes him to overlook the striking similarity between Popper's conclusion and his own.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 135 , October 1960 , pp. 355 - 356
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy1960

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 355 note 1 The Open Society and Its Enemies, Third ed.. Vol. II, pp. 261–8.

page 355 note 2 Examples would be the points of view that history is most fruitfully considered as the history of: class struggle, or power politics, or economics, or great men, or the fight for the open society, etc. Conflicting points of view exist in science too, particularly regarding aims and methods. For example the points of view that science is best regarded as: an attempt to describe the world economically; an attempt to explain the world mechanically; a means of making predictions; or simply a set of interconnected definitions and so on.

page 355 note 3 Professor Pass more's parallel with his study of Hume's Intentions is exact here. His hypothesis about Hume can surely conflict with, e.g. a newly discovered work of Hume's. But his point of view (something like “Hume is interesting”) is hardly open to such a test.

page 356 note 1 In The Logic of Scientific Discovery, pp. 81–4, section 20, “Methodological Rules”. Just as Professor Pass more could explain away an alleged new work of Hume's in any number of ways.