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Politics and Expertise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

John Wilson
Affiliation:
Farmington Trust Research Unit, Oxford.

Extract

I wish here to advance the still unfashionable thesis that there can be ‘political experts’ not just in the sense (a) that some people are better than others at practical politics (getting bills passed, etc.), nor (b) that there are experts who can tell us the best means to achieve our ends, nor (c) that some people are expert in reconciling political interests, making good compromises, and so forth. I mean (d) that there are people better equipped than others to decide what is right, in the context of ends as well as means, for a society or a state: the thesis maintained but inadequately defended in Plato's Republic. The thesis does not, of course, entail (e) that these experts are eo ipso entitled to enforce their status as experts, or their decisions, on the rest of us: at most, it would entail that the rest of us would be wise to entrust such decisions to the experts.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1971

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References

1 See Bambrough's, Renford essay in Laslett, and Runciman, (eds.) Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. I.Google Scholar

2 Popper, Karl, The Open Society and its Enemies.Google Scholar

3 See Wilson, John et al. , Introduction to Moral Education, Chs. 1–4.Google Scholar