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A Philosopher And Intelligence Tests

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

W. Mays
W. Mays
Affiliation:
University of Manchester
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Extract

The most interesting feature about Mr. Richardson's criticism of my paper (PHILOSOPHY, October 1954) is that it reveals the typical attitude of the traditional intelligence tester which I set out to criticize. He accepts the view (1) that intelligence deals mainly with the grasping of relationships, (2) that intelligence thus defined is an innate ability, (3) that it may be relatively isolated by the use of suitably designed tests and treated independently of other abilities.

Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 113 , April 1955 , pp. 164 - 166
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1955

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References

1 Spearman's treatment of eduction is clear enough from the following: “This word ‘educe,’ then, we will choose for the purpose of distinguishing the manifestations of the second principle (as also of the third) from those of the first; in this way, ‘eduction’ will be opposed to ‘apprehension.’ ” When speaking of the experiential apprehension “I-see-red” he says, “The relation of ‘seeing’ may be regarded as not educible from the intrinsic characters of the ‘I’ and the ‘red’, but only observable in actual occurrence.”(Nature of Intelligence, p. 77.)