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A Phenomenological System of Ethics (II)
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
Extract
The manner in which the phenomenological method has been applied to the data of ethics by Max Scheler, and his resulting criticisms of the formalism of classical theories of an absolute good and the subjectivity and relativity of the opposing “content theories,” have been discussed in a previous article. It is the purpose of the present paper to present Scheler’s claim to have resolved this dilemma in ethics by laying bare a structure of value too often obscured by the series of falsifications and confusions that he has exposed.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1933
References
page 52 note 1 Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die Materiale Wertethik. Third Edition, Halle, , 1927, pp. 340–57.Google Scholar
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page 54 note1 See esp. Vom. Ewigen im Menschen, vol. i, Pt. 2,Probleme der Religion, Second Edition, Leipzig, 1923, passim, e.g. pp. 252 ff.Google Scholar
page 55 note 1 It must, however, be remembered that the value of such an “organic whole” bears no constant or calculable relation to the values of its elements; hence the situation may be bad on the whole, though containing a valuable factor, as in the love of cruelty. For a discussion of such cases see Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, Cambridge, 1922 edition, pp. 27 ff.Google Scholar
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page 56 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 149 ff.
page 56 note 3 Op. cit., pp. 192 ff.
page 57 note 1 Op, cit., pp. 199 ff.
page 57 note 2 Der Formalismus in der Ethik, pp. 87–98.
page 58 note 1 Cf. Bentham’s criterion of fecundity.
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page 61 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 507–8.
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page 62 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 597–605.
page 63 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 516–18.
page 63 note 2 Op. cit., pp. 512–14.
page 63 note 3 As he himself had formerly believed. See Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen, pp. 199 ad finem referred to above.
page 64 note 1 Formalismus, pp. 524–7.
page 64 note 2 Op. cit., p. 530.
page 64 note 3 Op. cit., pp. 523–5.
page 64 note 4 Op. cit., pp. 614–15.
page 64 note 5 Op. cit., pp. 348–50.
page 65 note 1 Op. cit., pp. 527–9. Cf. also the later essay. Die Formen des Wissens und die Bildung, included in the volume Philosophische Weltanschauung, Bonn, 1929, p. 104: “To be cultured is not to make oneself into a work of art, i.e. deliberately to aim at one’s own beauty, or virtue, or knowledge.”
page 65 note 2 Op. cit., p. 528.
page 65 note 3 Leipzig, 1926.