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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
In recent years sense–datum theories have received much criticism, but there is one type of error frequently involved in the sense–datum concept which is in need of further consideration. This error consists in a category confusion of such a nature that what is properly regarded as perceptual mode is treated as though it were the attribute of a thing. The mode or manner of perception is mistakenly transferred to the sense–datum with results which a little careful reflection shows to be absurd. In what follows a specific case of this error connected with the notion of phenomenal organization will be discussed.
page 333 note 1 In ordinary discourse we not only describe our perceptual experiences in terms of their objects but also in terms of such things as adequacy and pleasantness. Thus a perception might be described as clear and pleasant.
page 334 note 1 Various psychological studies have shown that in most cases a group of five is the largest number of things we can see as a specific number of things. If the objects are arranged in a good gestalt, however, the maximum number of things perceptible as that number of things is seven. It will not be found that practice will increase this number. See Wilhelm Wundt, Outlines of Psychology, translated by Judd, C. H. (Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmanns, 1896), p. 212; and A. D. Glanville and D. M. Dallenbach, “The Range of Attention”, American Journal of Psychology, 1929, 41, pp. 207–236.Google Scholar
page 335 note 1 Cf. Chisholm, R. M., “The Theory of Appearing”, Philosophical Analysis, edited by Black, Max (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1950), pp. 106–107.Google Scholar