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On the Logic of Being a Democrat1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Marvin Schiller
Marvin Schiller
Affiliation:
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Texas
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Extract

The central purpose of this paper is to sketch the logic of being a democrat. That is, what is involved in being a democrat will be defined and delineated. I shall proceed by first examining Richard Wollheim's alleged paradox of democratic theory. Wollheim's solution to the paradox will then be shown to be unsatisfactory. Next, the concept of being a democrat will be clarified. The stage will then be set for showing that Wollheim's alleged paradox of democratic theory dissolves upon discerning what a democrat qua democrat is committed to believe. In the process of clarifying what is involved in being a democrat and dissolving the alleged paradox of democratic theory, it will become evident that one popular argument often levelled against resistance to democratic law is without foundation. This is the argument that any democrat who conscientiously disobeys valid democratic law is necessarily behaving inconsistently with his democratic principles; and, therefore, if someone does conscientiously disobey valid democratic law, it proves he is not ‘really’ a democrat after all.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 44 , Issue 167 , January 1969 , pp. 46 - 56
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1969

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References

2 Wollheim, Richard, ‘A Paradox in the Theory of Democracy,’ Philosophy, Politics, and Society, Second Series, Laslett, Peter and Runciman, W. O., eds. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), pp. 71–87.Google Scholar

3 Ibid., pp. 78–79 (italics in the original).

4 Ibid., p. 78; p. 84.

5 Ibid., p. 85 (italics in the original).

6 Ibid., (italics in the original).

7 Ibid., (emphasis mine).

8 By ‘prima facie binding’ I mean ‘that which is binding in the absence of any overriding considerations to the contrary’.

9 Gardiner, P. L., ‘On Assenting to a Moral Principle’, The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, LV (1954–1955), pp. 23–44.Google Scholar

10 Wollheim, , p. 78; p. 84.Google Scholar

11 Barry, Brian, Political Argument (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 58–66, especially pp. 65–66.Google Scholar

12 For Barry's discussion of the nature of political principles see Ibid., pp. 35–52, especially pp. 36–38.

13 Barry, , p. 66.Google Scholar

14 The core cases of civil disobedience are instances of non-violent, public and constitutionally illegal actions for which the agent voluntarily accepts the legal penalty and which are specifically designed to protest, frustrate or influence the repeal, enactment, modification, reinterpretation or enforcement of any law, policy or decision of the state.