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On Knowing Which Thing I Am

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 October 2004

Joel Smith
Joel Smith
Affiliation:
University of Essex
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Abstract

Russell's Principle states that in order to think about an object I must know which thing it is, in the sense of being able to distinguish it from all other things. I show that, contra Strawson, Evans and Cassam, Russell's Principle cannot be applied to first-person thought so as to yield necessary conditions of self-consciousness.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 79 , Issue 4 , October 2004 , pp. 591 - 608
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2004

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Footnotes

Thanks to Naomi Eilan, Keith Hossack, Lucy O'Brien and Ann Whittle for helpful comments.