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Objectivity In Morals

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

B. Mayo
Affiliation:
University of Birmingham.

Extract

There is among many moral philosophers today a renewed emphasis on the connection between reason and morality, and an attempt to exhibit moral behaviour as characteristically rational. What is original in Mr. Kneale's extremely interesting paper (April 1950) is the following-up of a suggestion that certain words like “right,” “wrong,” “ought,” are used in the same way both by lawyers and by moralists; this leads to a logical rehabilitation of the somewhat unpopular concept of the moral law, which in turn argues objectivity and rationality in morals, and makes it possible “to distinguish between good and bad moralists in much the same way as we can distinguish between good and bad lawyers.” The legal pattern is essentially the same as the moral pattern.

Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1951

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