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Naturalism and Scepticism
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Extract
In this paper we argue that a dominant view of Humean naturalism involves a fundamental misconception of Hume's naturalist project. We shall show that the naturalist project as Hume conceives it is philosophically much more interesting than the form of naturalism commonly attributed to him. We shall also argue, however, that Hume's commitment to principles of empiricist epistemology prevented him from bringing his naturalist project to a satisfactory conclusion. Finally, we shall suggest that Wittgenstein shares Hume's conception of a philosophically satisfactory form of naturalism, and that, unencumbered by empiricist doctrines, Wittgenstein was able to provide the sort of undogmatic unravelling of the sceptical problem that eluded Hume.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1990
References
1 Strawson, P. F., Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, Methuen, London, 1985.Google Scholar
2 Ibid., 11.
3 Ibid., 14.
4 Ibid., 12.
5 Ibid., 11.
6 Ibid., 11.
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8 Ibid., 183.
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15 Op. cit., 12.
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17 Ibid., 12.
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19 Ibid., 249.
20 Ibid., pp. 248–9.
21 Ibid., 249.
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24 Ibid., 53.
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27 Ibid., 44–5.
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30 Ibid., 193.
31 See Wittgenstein, L., On Certainty, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969.Google Scholar
32 Ibid., para. 248.
33 Ibid., para. 204.
34 Ibid., para. 110.
35 For further discussion of this interpretation of Wittgenstein see McGinn, Marie, Sense and Certainty (Oxford: Blackwell, 1989).Google Scholar
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