Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-dlnhk Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-22T04:24:41.322Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Moral Situation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Extract

Modern ethics has been chiefly concerned with the analysis of the conditions and principles of morality; and, in particular, one of its most important achievements has been the further elucidation of the Kantian dictum that “I ought” implies that I can. On the face of it Kant's contention seems perfectly straightforward, but, on examination, it becomes apparent that the simple word “can” covers a somewhat complicated ambiguity. When it is said that I ought to do act A, it may rightly be taken that I can do act A; but the question arises whether or not this in turn involves that I am aware that I can do act A. There is clearly some significance in the assertion that I can do many acts which, however, never occur to me, either because I am ignorant of certain facts or because I have a mistaken opinion about the facts. On the other hand, it may quite properly be said that I cannot perform any act of the possibility of which I am unaware. The problem then is to determine and examine the sense of the word “can” which is a pre-condition of moral obligation.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1949

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

page 335 note 1 Cf. Lewis, H. D.: Morals and the New Theology, pp. 3537Google Scholar.

page 335 note 2 Cf. H. A. Pritchard: Duty and Ignorance of Fact; Ross, W. D.: Foundations of Ethics, Ch. VIIGoogle Scholar.