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Moral Judgment, Action and Emotion
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
Abstract
What makes us responsive, however occasionally, to moral demands? Why do people sometimes own up, go off to fight unwillingly in what they consider to be just wars, refrain from stealing a march on friends, and so on, even when they could by doing otherwise reap advantages far outweighing, in the scales of ordinary prudential rationality, any consequent disadvantage? Why has morality such a hold over us?
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1984
References
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