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Moral Incapacities

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Ton Van Den Beld
Ton Van Den Beld
Affiliation:
Utrecht University
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Extract

There has been a time in my teaching career that I used to cite in my introductory classes ‘Moral Philosophy’ from Erica Jong's Fear of Flying (a best seller of the 1970's). The situation leading up to the quote is that the main character, Isadora, is asked a sexual favour by her brother in law, Pierre. Her answer and the subsequent dialogue read then as follows: ‘I can't’, I said. ‘Come on,’ Pierre said, ‘I'll teach you.’ ‘I didn't mean that… I meant that I can't; morally, I can…’

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 72 , Issue 282 , October 1997 , pp. 525 - 536
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1997

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References

1 Erica, Jong, Fear of Flying, (Panther Book 1974), 221–222.Google Scholar

2 Bernard, Williams, ‘Moral Incapacity.’ Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (1993), 59–70;Google Scholar reprinted in: idem, Making sense of humanity and other philosophical papers 1982-1993 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 46–55.Google Scholar

3 ‘Moral Incapacity,’ Philosophy 70, No. 272 (04 1995), 273–285.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

4 Williams, , op. cit., 60 (47). Henceforth all page numbers in the text refer to Williams's ‘Moral Incapacity,’ first number to the original publication, second number to the reprint, see note 2.Google Scholar

5 Aristotle might be interpreted as taking the view that the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is, at least in some cases, a decision; see Anthony, Kenny, Aristotle's Theory of the Will, (London: Duckworth., 1979), esp. 142–143.Google Scholar Robert Audi holds that the conclusion is a practical judgment which has the power ‘to produce, or at least to trigger, intention, decision or action.’ See his Practical Reasoning (London: Routledge, 1989), 99; cp. 18–19.Google Scholar

6 Cp. Audi, op. cit. 94-95, 118.

7 David, Wiggins, ‘Deliberation and Practical Reason,’ Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Amelie Oksenberg, Rorty (ed.) (Berkeley: University of California Press), 233.Google Scholar

8 See Oberman, Heiko A., Luther: Mensch zwischen Gott und Teufel (Berlin: Severin, 1982), 216. Note that the order of Luther's words is not as is usually assumed.Google Scholar

9 Cp. Anthoy, Kenny, Will, Freedom and Power (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), 123–129.Google Scholar

10 Cp. Mele, Alfred. R., Autonomous Agents. From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 60–61.Google Scholar

11 Both the passive nature of a moral incapacity and the emphasis on the third-personal point of view somehow reflect Williams's sympathy with ‘the Greeks’ and his acknowledgement of similarities between ‘Greek [ethical] conceptions and our own,’ Bernard, Williams, Shame and Necessity (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 2, 10; cp. 81–84, 103, 135–139.Google Scholar

12 Cp. Aristotle, : ‘We deliberate about things that are in our power and can be done,’ N.E. 1112a31;Google Scholarsee also Richard, Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blame. Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London: Duckworth, 1980), 227–242.Google Scholar

13 Cp. Geach, P., God and the Soul (London: Routledge, 1969), 123.Google ScholarSee also Aristotle, , N.E. 1103a31-1103b3.Google Scholar

14 Taylor, , ‘Moral Incapacity,’ 277. All further page numbers in the text refer to this article (for details, see note 3).Google Scholar

15 Taylor identifies, rightly I think, the considerations which play a role in Williams's account of deliberation leading up to the discovery of a moral incapacity, with so called ‘internal reasons’ as explained in : Williams's ‘Internal and External Reasons,’ in: Bernard, Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–113.Google Scholar

16 Let it be noted that there need not have been a prior connection between that moral ground and R's motivational set (his dispositions or whatever).

17 See Velleman, J. David, ‘What Happens When Someone Acts?’ Mind, 101 (1992), 476–478.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

18 Eleonore Stump has identified the agent with her reasoning faculty, see her ‘Sanctification, Hardening of the Heart, and Frankfurt's Concept of Free Will,’ Journal of Philosophy 85 (1988), 410.Google Scholar

19 For more about the conditions of self-control, see Mele, Alfred R., op. cit. (see note 10).Google Scholar

20 Cp. Velleman, , op. cit. 479. It might be obvious by now that I am not paraphrasing Aristotle in his own terms.Google Scholar

21 John, McDowell, ‘Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?’ In: The Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Vol. 52 (1978), 26–29.Google Scholar

22 Op. cit. 27-28.

23 Op. cit. 28

24 Of course, if we take the course of action mentioned to an agent or crossing his mind to be an abomination, a real incapacity may be involved. Think, for example, of moral abominations such as having sexual intercourse with a dead body, or with an animal. Most of us, I presume, are psychologically incapable of doing these things. Note that these incapacities have nothing to do with deliberation. They are a matter of sheer impotence.