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Mill on Happiness as an End

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Grenville Wall
Grenville Wall
Affiliation:
Middlesex Polytechnic
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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 57 , Issue 222 , October 1982 , pp. 537 - 541
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1982

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References

1 See, for instance, the selections by Everett W. Hall, Mary Warnock and Maurice Mandelbaum in Mill: A Collection of Critical Essays, J. B. Schneewind (ed.) (London: Macmillan, 1969).

2 All page references are to the Fontana edition of Mill's Utilitarianism, edited by Mary Warnock (London: Collins, 1962).

3 The possibility of this is entertained by R. F. Atkinson in ‘J. S. Mill's “Proof” of the Principle of Utility’, Philosophy 32 (1957).

4 G. E. Moore's criticism is to be found on p. 67 of Principia Ethica (London: Cambridge University Press, 1903).

5 Mill, A System of Logic, Book VI, Chapter XII, Sections 1 and 6.

6 Atkinson, op. cit., 161, rules out this possibility and so does Norman Kretzmann in ‘Desire as Proof of Desirability’, Philosophical Quarterly 8 (1958), 257.