^{page 7 note 1} Cf. his History of Vitalism.

^{page 7 note 2} In recent times it is represented by the ‘entelechy’ of the earlier writings of Professor Hans Driesch and by the special form of teleologically operating energy postulated by the late Eugenio Rignano.

^{page 8 note 1} Yet this seems to be the position of Dr. L. J. Henderson in The Order of Nature, and of Dr. Joseph Needham in Man a Machine.

^{page 10 note 1} Jung, Münsterberg, Erisman, Spranger.

^{page 10 note 2} As I have pointed out in my Modern Materialism, the failure of universal mechanical explanation leaves us with no other meaning or possibility of definition of the word ‘mechanistic,’ a fact which seems to be recognized by very few of those who use the word. Such negative definition is not very satisfactory; and those who seek to find a more positive definition of the term ‘mechanistic explanation’ commonly offer some such phrase as ‘the kind of explanation given by physics and chemistry.’ The mechanist position (as here distinguished from the strictly mechanical) is in high favour with the biologists especially. All the many adherents of what is called the organismic view belong to this group; all those who insist on the unity and wholeness of the organism; and all the many who have accepted the principle of ‘emergence’ as the key to hitherto incomprehensible properties of organisms. Here must be reckoned also most of the psychologists of the now so flourishing Gestalt school. It is strange that no one hitherto seems to have attempted the synthesis of the kindred principles of emergence and Gestalt. The obstacle to such

^{page 11 note 1} It was surely always obvious to the more impartial thinkers that the strictly mechanical system of explanation was not applicable to such facts as the chemical affinities and properties of elements and compounds. When I was an undergraduate student of chemistry we used to think of the atoms of a molecule as linked together with little hooks which were represented on the blackboard by short straight lines. But no one, I suppose, took these mechanical symbols very literally; and we talked about forces of attraction and repulsion exerted by the atoms upon one another, forces which were

^{page 12 note 1} It was surely always obvious to the more impartial thinkers that the strictly mechanical system of explanation was not applicable to such facts as the chemical affinities and properties of elements and compounds. When I was an undergraduate student of chemistry we used to think of the atoms of a molecule as linked together with little hooks which were represented on the blackboard by short straight lines. But no one, I suppose, took thesemechanical symbols very literally; and we talked about forces of attraction and repulsion exerted by the atoms upon one another, forces which were supposed to act very powerfully across small distances. I remember also that in the pre-relativity and pre-quantum period a physicist of high standing, Wilhelm Ostwald, secured widely diffused interest in his proposal to overcome scientific materialism by abolishing matter altogether, substituting for it a great variety of forms of energy, among which were mental or physical energies (Vorlesungen über Naturphilosophie, Leipzig, 1902Google Scholar). “I believe,” writes a modern physicist, “many will discover in themselves a longing for mechanical explanation which has all the tenacity of original sin. The discovery of such a desire need not occasion any particular alarm, because it is easy to see how the demand for this sort of explanation has had its origin in the enormous preponderance of the mechanical in our physical experience. But nevertheless, just as the old monks struggled to subdue the flesh, so must the physicist struggle to subdue this sometimes nearly irresistible, but perfectly unjustifiable, desire. One of the large purposes of this exposition will be attained if it carries the conviction that this longing is unjustifiable” (ProfessorBridgman, P. W. in The Logic of Modern Physics, New York, 1928Google Scholar). It may be added that the psychological root of this illegitimate longing is the fact that all our own causal activity directed upon the world about us, both animate and inanimate, seems to be (with certain possible but rare exceptions) exerted by moving parts of our bodies and, by means of such movements, communicating motion to other things. If it were common experience to communicate with our fellows telepathically or to ignite fire or to initiate other chemical changes by direct volition, the mechanical system would never have enjoyed exclusive favour. The reading of Professor Bridgman's book strongly suggests the need for a companion volume on the psychology of modern physics.

^{page 13 note 1} Prominent among the former group (the smaller, I imagine) are Eddington and Jeans. The latter writes: “The fact that ‘loose jointedness’ [William James's favourite appellation] of any type whatever pervades the whole universe destroys the case for absolutely strict causation, this latter being the characteristic of perfectly fitting machinery.” And: “Although we are still far from any positive knowledge, it seems possible that there may be some factor, for which we have so far found no better name than fate [‘why not purposive activity’ ?] operating in nature to neutralize the cast-iron inevitability of the old law of causation. The future may not be as unalterably determined by the past as we used to think.” Again, after showing that a mechanical universal ether is impossible, he writes: “We are compelled to start afresh. Our difficulties have all arisen from our initial assumption that everything in nature, and waves of light in particular, admitted of mechanical explanation; we tried in brief to treat the universe as a huge machine. As this had led us into a wrong path, we must look for some other guiding principle.” And yet again: “The picture of the universe presented by the new physics contains more room than did the old mechanical picture for life and consciousness to exist within the picture itself, together with the attributes which we commonly associate with them, such as free-will and the capacity to make the universe in some small degree different by our presence. For, for aught we know, or for aught that the new science can say to the contrary, the gods which play the part of fate to the atoms of our brains may be our own minds. Through these atoms our minds [our purposive strivings] may perchance affect the motions of our bodies and so the state of the world around us. To-day science can no longer shut the door on this possibility; she has no longer any unanswerable arguments to bring against our innate conviction of free-will.” To which it may be added that she never had any such arguments, a fact which seems to escape both Eddington and Jeans. These passages are cited from The Mysterious Universe, New York, 1930.Similarly Eddington says in a recent address: “His [the physicist’s] first step should be to make clear that he no longer holds the position, occupied for so long, of chief advocate for determinism, and that if there is any deterministic law in the physical universe he is unaware of it.” (Presidential Address to the Mathematical Association, 1932.)

^{page 14 note 1} The Order of Nature.

^{page 14 note 2} This position I have discussed at some length as modern materialism, the present day successor to strict or literal materialism, in my Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution (London and New York, 1928). Some confusion arises from the fact that some of the scientists who hold to the new materialism use the word ‘mechanistic’ as synonymous with ‘mechanical’; hence they repudiate what they call the ‘mechanistic theory’ (meaning the strictly mechanical) while refusing to recognize the causal efficacy of purposive activity. This is not a third position; it is merely a variety of the new materialism (as defined above), and might well be called crypto-materialism.It is the position of the leaders of the Gestalt school of psychology.