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Justification of Empirical Belief: Problems with Haack's Foundherentism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Alan C. Clune
Alan C. Clune
Affiliation:
State University of New York at Buffalo
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 72 , Issue 281 , July 1997 , pp. 460 - 463
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1997

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References

1 Unless otherwise noted, all citations refer to pages from Susan, Haack, Evidence and Inquiry (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).Google Scholar

3 Reliabilism, as I am speaking of it here, is the view that a belief is justified in case it is produced by processes that are generally reliable.

4 In Haack's terminology, experience provides the ultimate evidence for the justification of empirical beliefs; see pp. 213-214.Google Scholar

5 The contribution from experience, in Haack's terminology, ‘anchors’ justification rather than provides a foundation for justification.

6 Haack. p. 43.

7 Haack. p. 43.

8 Haack. pp. 213 and 214.

9 Haack. p. 218.

10 Ibid..

11 Haack. pp. 218-220.

12 This qualification avoids a recurrence of the problem we are trying to resolve.

13 Haack. p. 212.