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Is it True What She Says About Tarski?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Karl Popper
Karl Popper
Affiliation:
Penn, Buckinghamshire
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Extract

In a paper ‘Is it True What They Say About Tarski?’, Dr Susan Haack explicitly denies the truth of an implicit assertion of mine, by writing ‘… Tarski does not present his theory as a correspondence theory’. My reply is to quote two brief passages from Tarski's work.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 54 , Issue 207 , January 1979 , pp. 98
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1979

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References

1 Philosophy 51 (1976), 323–336.Google Scholar

2 Haack refers to my Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963, 1976), 224, 225–226Google Scholar. I assert there, on p. 223, that Tarski ‘rehabilitated the correspondence theory of absolute or objective truth’. She does not seem to have seen my quotation on p. 116, note 33.

3 Haack, , op. cit., 324.Google Scholar

4 Tarski, A., ‘The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages’ (first presented in Polish, 1931), Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, tr. by Woodger, J. H. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), 152–278Google Scholar. The quotation is from p. 153.

5 Tarski, A., ‘The Establishment of Scientific Semantics’ (first presented 1935), op. cit., 401–408. The quotation is from p. 404.Google Scholar