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Intersubjective Properties by Which We Specify Pain, Pleasure, and Other Kinds of Mental States

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 January 2000

Irwin Goldstein
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Abstract

How do people learn names for kinds of sensations? Wittgenstein identifies two possibilities. 1. Direct acquaintance: A person feels a sensation, notes its intrinsic character, and sets about to use the word thereafter for this sensation. 2. Outward signs: A person pins his use of the word to the sensation's outward signs. Wittgenstein rejects 1 and endorses 2. He thinks a sensation name can be learned only if people pin their use of the word to outward signs. I identify a third procedure and show we name many sensations and other kinds of mental states this way.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 75 , Issue 1 , January 2000 , pp. 89 - 104
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000

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