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Intentionality and Art

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

David Best
David Best
Affiliation:
University College of Swansea
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Extract

A work of art is something which is unlike anything else. It is art which, best of all, gives us the idea of what is particular.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 56 , Issue 217 , July 1981 , pp. 349 - 363
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1981

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References

1 Weil, Simone, Lectures on Philosophy, translated by Price, Hugh (Cambridge University Press, 1978), 59CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 I use the spelling ‘intentional’ to refer to the object-directedness of mental acts. ‘Intensional’ I take to be contrasted with ‘extensional’, in the sense that an intensional context is one in which it is not necessarily the case that the substitution of a co-referential expression in a given linguistic context will give a sentence with the same truth-value. As far as I understand the issue, the two phenomena are distinct although related, since a mental state is directed on to an intentional object only under a certain description, hence not any substitution of a co-referential expression will adequately characterize the object of the mental state. The nature of the relationship is complex. For a detailed discussion see the symposium by Kneale and Prior, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume, 1968.

3 Langer, Susanne, Philosophy in a New Key (London: Oxford University Press, 1951)Google Scholar.

4 Beardsmore, R. W., ‘ Two Trends in Contemporary Aesthetics’, British Journal of Aesthetics. 13, No. 4 (Autumn 1973)Google Scholar.

5 Casey, J. P., The Language of Criticism (London: Methuen, 1966)Google Scholar.

6 Hepburn, R. W., ‘Emotions and Emotional Qualities’, Collected Papers on Aesthetics, Barrett, C. (ed.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1965), 196Google Scholar.

7 Op. cit., 192.

8 Meager, R., ‘The Uniqueness of a Work of Art’, Collected Papers on Aesthetics, Barrett, C. (ed.) (Oxford: Blackwell, 1965), 196Google Scholar.

9 Rhees, R., Without Answers (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969)Google Scholar, Chap. 13.

10 Winch, P., The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958), 122Google Scholar.

11 Anscombe, G. E. M., ‘The Intentionality of Sensation: a Grammatical Feature’, Analytical Philosophy, II, Butler, (ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 166–7Google Scholar.

12 I have considered this issue more fully in a paper entitled ‘The Objectivity of Artistic Appreciation’, British Journal of Aesthetics 20, No. 4 (Spring, 1980).

13 I am indebted to Howard Mounce, Colin Phillips and David Cockburn for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.