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Hobbes and ‘The Beautiful Axiom’
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 January 2009
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The ‘beautiful axiom’ to which Dickens refers is a central feature of Thomas Hobbes' thinking but its precise role in his moral philosophy remains unclear. I shall here attempt both to dispel the unclarity and to evaluate the adequacy of the position that emerges. Given the high level of contemporary interest in Hobbes' thought, both within and beyond philosophical circles, this is an enterprise of considerable importance. None the less, my interest is not merely interpretative, since the assessment of Hobbes' attitude to ‘the beautiful axiom’ raises important and difficult questions about what might be termed the preconditions of morality.
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References
1 Kavka, Gregory S., Hobbesian Moral and Political Philosophy (Princeton University Press, 1986), 358–59.Google Scholar
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