Perhaps the most remarkable thing about Professor Findlay's generally remarkable book is that it was written at all. Only a few years ago Hegel seemed to be the most discredited of philosophers: Professor Ryle was heard to say that he could not make sense of his writings “even as error”, and there were few avant-garde, or even moderately up-to-date, philosophers in Great Britain who were prepared to take them with any seriousness, let alone to give time to their elucidation. It is true that Popper's portrait of Hegel as not only intellectually disreputable, but morally dishonest as well, was received with some incredulity; people could scarcely bring themselves to believe that matters were as bad as that, even before Mr. Kaufmann showed conclusively that they were not. But it is one thing to acquit Hegel of the charge of being a conscious fraud and another altogether to view his work with positive admiration. Despite hints to the effect that Hegel and Wittgenstein had views in common, it was not to be expected that someone as fully conversant with, and as appreciative of, recent philosophical work as is Professor Findlay should devote himself to a full-scale reassessment of Hegelianism and come out with a verdict which is very largely favourable. Yet it is just this that we find in the present book.