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The problem to which the present paper is addressed is one aspect of that of the relationship between Religion and Morality. That God is good is a proposition which presents itself to many with axiomatic force, and by its help the path is traced which leads directly either from Religion to Morality or from Morality to Religion. Yet the reflective mind may well ask: By what evidence, or in what way, do we know that God is good? If the proposition rests on evidence in the ordinary sense, what is it and wherein lies its convincing character? Or if it rests, as is often asserted, on another sort of knowledge altogether, what is this non-experiential cognition and what are its guarantees ? Or again, we may ask whether the proposition is analytic, i.e.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1927
References
page 504 note 1 Milford, fourth impression, 1926.
page 504 note 2 Idea of the Holy, p. 12
page 504 note 3 Loc. cit.
page 505 note 1 The phrases are Kant's.
page 505 note 2 Threshold of Religion, London, 1909, Pref., p. xi.Google Scholar
page 505 note 3 Ibid., p. xvi.
page 505 note 4 Op. cit., p. 124.
page 505 note 5 Loc. cit.
page 505 note 6 Op. cit., p. 120, from Codrington.
page 505 note 7 Op. cit., p. 121, from Tregear.
page 505 note 8 Op. cit., p. 125, from M'Gee.
page 507 note 1 Idea of the Holy, chap, xvii, p. 140 f.
page 507 note 2 Ibid., p. 130.
page 508 note 1 Idea of the Holy, p. 131.
page 510 note 1 That is, of course, as an ‘ a priori category.’ For the a posteriori argument, disavowed, or rather (on their own showing) transcended, by theories of ‘ experience,’ see below.
page 511 note 1 Idea of the Holy, pp. 140–1.
page 515 note 1 Dewey, , Experience and Nature (1925), pp. 17, 18.Google Scholar (Italics of the last sentence mine.)