Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-v2bm5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-18T19:59:01.467Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

God and Scientific Verifiability

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

John Leslie
John Leslie
Affiliation:
University of Guelph
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

What force has the Argument from Design—the attempt to argue to Design, and hence to God, from various alleged signs of it in Nature?

Some preliminary points. First: To establish the reality of God need not be to prove that there exists an actual person meriting that name. Many theologians, for example P. Tillich, have denied that God is any manner of existent. On a fairly simple and attractive interpretation, their view is that ‘God’ names the principle that ethical requirements are creatively powerful. In previous papers I tried to make sense of this principle: there is much that can be said for it. So when talking of ‘design’ I am not presupposing anything as specific as an actual designer.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 53 , Issue 203 , January 1978 , pp. 71 - 79
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1978

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 ‘The Theory that the World Exists Because It Should’, American Philosophical Quarterly 7, No. 4 (10 1970), 286–298Google Scholar; and ‘Ethically Required Existence’, American Philosophical Quarterly 9, No. 3 (07 1972), 215–224.Google Scholar

2 ‘Morality in a World Guaranteed Best Possible’, Studia Leibnitiana III, Heft 3 (1971), 199–205Google Scholar; ‘The Value of Time’, American Philosophical Quarterly 13, No. 2 (04 1976), 109–121Google Scholar; ‘The Best World Possible’, in King-Farlow, J. (ed.), The Challenge of Religion Today (New York: Neale Watson, 1976).Google Scholar

3 ‘Does Causal Regularity Defy Chance?’, Idealistic Studies 3, No. 3 (09 1973), 277–284.Google Scholar

4 New Scientist 57, No. 839 (29 03 1973), 708.Google Scholar