^{page 450 note 1} Page 97.

^{page 451 note 1} Op. cit., p. 101.

^{page 451 note 2} Ibid., p. 103. Joseph, it may be noted, is not thinking of Gestalt psychology. On the contrary, he discounts the Gestalt hypothesis (along with that of Behaviourism) because of what he regards as mechanistic implications incompatible with the ethical viewpoint. At the same time, if we disregard the question of ultimate presuppositions and try to apply the Gestalt concept of form to the ideational or non-perceptual levels, we get something at least very like what Joseph is trying to describe.

^{page 451 note 3} Psychological Principles, p. 100.

^{page 452 note 1} The Name and Nature of Poetry, p. 49 (italics mine).

^{page 454 note 1} Wheeler, : The Science of Psychology, p. 126.Google Scholar

^{page 455 note 1} One is reminded of Bergson's theory of laughter, according to which the comic is the result of an attempt to impose mechanism on life. In the same connection (i.e. “living according to rule"), Muirhead's question is interesting: “Does it fall outside morality, we might ask, to cultivate the sense of truth and perfection (not to say of humour) that preserves a man from being ‘uncoguid'?” (Rule and End in Morals, p. 109; italics mine).

^{page 455 note 2} Series I, pp. 156–157.Google Scholar