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Figuring Things Out, Morally Speaking

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 April 2021

Leo Zaibert
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Abstract

The appeal of the moral principle according to which we should treat like cases alike is so great that it verges on the axiomatic, or on the platitudinous. Recently, however, the principle has been challenged in deeply interesting ways. These ways are interesting because they do not invite skepticism about morality at large, but about the specific claim that what is good (or bad) for an agent in a given situation must be good (or bad) for any other similarly situated agent. I here assess the post-challenge viability of the principle. In a sense, the principle survives, but this is neither an unqualified victory nor an inspiring result. The examination of these matters contains an important (and under-investigated) lesson about the nature of moral experience.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 96 , Issue 4 , October 2021 , pp. 553 - 576
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Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy, 2021

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