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Does Virtue Epistemology Provide a Better Account of the Ad Hominem Argument? A Reply to Christopher Johnson

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 December 2010

Gary Jason
Gary Jason*
Affiliation:
California State University, Fullerton
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Christopher Johnson has put forward in this journal the view that ad hominem reasoning may be more generally reasonable than is allowed by writers such as myself, basing his view on virtue epistemology. I review his account, as well as the standard account, of ad hominem reasoning, and show how the standard account would handle the cases he sketches in defense of his own view. I then give four criticisms of his view generally: the problems of virtue conflict, vagueness, conflation of speech acts, and self-defeating counsel. I then discuss four reasons why the standard account is superior: it better fits legal reality, the account of other fallacies, psychological science, and political reality.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 86 , Issue 1 , January 2011 , pp. 95 - 119
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2011

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References

1 Johnson, Christopher M., ‘Reconsidering the Ad Hominem’ Philosophy 84 (2009), 251–266CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

2 Johnson, op. cit. 252.

3 Hinman, Lawrence, ‘The Case For Ad Hominem Arguments’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 60 (1982), 338–345CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Jason, Gary James, ‘Is There A Case For Ad Hominem Arguments?’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), 182–185CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

5 Johnson, op. cit., 257.

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7 Jason, Gary, Critical Thinking: Developing an Effective Worldview (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2001)Google Scholar. See Chapter 8, sections 1 and 3.

8 Jason, op. cit. Chapter 3.

9 Johnson, op. cit., 253–254.

10 Jason, Critical Thinking, 232–236.

11 Johnson, op. cit., 254, says, ‘When these optimal conditions do not obtain, though, as when we don't have the necessary time or facility to fully determine the correctness of claims, ad hominem considerations can play a relevant role. In such situations they cease to be abusive and become appropriate means of evaluation.’

12 Johnson, op. cit., 257, mid-page.

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