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² Singer, Peter, Animal Liberation (London: Cape, 1976), 16.Google Scholar

³ Thus Dennis and Melzack: ‘The appropriate behavioural response to overt damage may be inactivity; pain arising from trauma should presumably promote such behaviour. However, the appropriate behavioural response to threat may be vigorous activity; pain arising from threat should therefore promote this sort of activity. Thus the overt expression of pain sensation may actually be a combination of inherently contradictory processes and behavioural tendencies.’ Dennis, S. and Melzack, R., ‘Perspectives on Phylogenetic Evolution of Pain Expression’, Animal Pain: Perception and Alleviation, Kitchell, R. L. and Erickson, H. H. (eds), (Bethesda: American Physiological Society, 1983), 155.Google Scholar

⁴ See, e.g., Melzack, Ronald, The Puzzle of Pain (Ringwood: Penguin, 1973) 93–103, 162f.Google Scholar

⁵ Thus Theodore Barber reports of individuals chronically insensitive to pain that for most, if not all, ‘no distinct localized damage exists in the central nervous system’. ‘Toward a Theory of Pain’, Psychological Bulletin 56 (1959), 443Google Scholar. It is true that Barber cites no evidence from autopsies, and that more sophisticated scanning apparatus has been developed since this publication, but the fact that this insensitivity to pain can be reversed without surgical intervention would support Barber's observation.

⁶ See Paterson, David's article of the same name in World Medicine 3 05 1980, 21–24Google Scholar. Also see Nelkin, Norton, ‘Pains and Pain Sensations’, The Journal of Philosophy 83 (1986), 129–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁷ On ‘Hindsight’ see Weisenkrantz, Larry, ‘Varieties of Residual Experience’, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology 32 (1980), 365–386CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Natsoulas, Thomas, ‘Conscious Perception and the Paradox of “Blindsight”’, in Aspects of Consciousness, III, Underwood, Geoffrey (ed.), (London: Academic Press, 1982), 79–109.Google Scholar

⁸ Weisenkrantz, Larry, ‘Trying to Bridge some Neurophysiological gaps between Monkey and Man’, British Journal of Psychology 68 (1977), 431–435.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

⁹ On the possibility of ‘non-conscious experience’, see Carruthers, Peter, ‘Brute Experience’, The Journal of Philosophy 86 (1989), 258–269.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁰ This is also suggested by Carruthers, ibid., 266–269.

¹¹ The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435–450.Google Scholar

¹² Ibid., 442.

¹³ Colin McGinn has made a similar point from a different perspective. He argues that the mystery of our mental life arises out of the fact that we simply do not possess the cognitive faculties necessary to solve the mind-body problem. ‘Cognitive closure’ prevents our ever having access to that vital natural link which presumably exists between brain states and conscious states. See McGinn, Colin, ‘Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?’, Mind 98 (1989), 349–366.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

¹⁴ On congenital insensitivity to pain see Melzack, , The Puzzle of Pain, 15f.Google Scholar

¹⁵ McFarland, David, ‘Pain’, The Oxford Companion to Animal Behaviour, McFarland, David (ed.), (Oxford University Press, 1981), 439.Google Scholar

¹⁶ Quoted in Boakes, Robert, From Darwin to Behaviourism (Cambridge University Press, 1984), 40Google Scholar. This dictum is actually a version of the Aristotelian principle, ‘Nature does nothing in vain’, couched in evolutionary terms.

¹⁷ Meditations II.Google Scholar

¹⁸ Descartes' clearest explanation of the matter comes in a letter to the English Platonist, Henry More. See Descartes, , Philosophical Letters, Kenny, Anthony (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 243–245.Google Scholar

¹⁹ It may seem that Morgan and Descartes are making the same point, but they are not. Morgan's canon was virtually a biological application of the second law of thermodynamics, asserting that a complex biological system would not evolve if a simpler one could perform the same function. Of course, in applying this canon to ‘psychical’ functions, Morgan seems to have committed himself to the view that more complex mental states require a more complex physical apparatus.

²⁰ Thus Descartes admitted in his letter to More that his thesis about animals was only probable. Philosophical Letters, 244.Google Scholar

²¹ Quoted in Weisenkrantz, Larry, ‘Neurophysiology and the Nature of Consciousness’, Mindwaves, Blakemore, C. and Greenfield, S. (eds), (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 309.Google Scholar

²² The terms ‘intentional stance’ and ‘design stance’ are D. C. Dennett's. See his Brainstorms (Hassocks: Harvester Press, 1978), 3–22.Google Scholar

²³ Meditation IVGoogle Scholar (HR I, 192)Google Scholar my emphasis. Cf. Norton Nelkin, who states that pain is an attitude not a sensation. ‘Pains and Pain Sensations’, 148.Google Scholar

²⁴ See Milgram, Stanley, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Tavistock, 1974).Google Scholar

²⁵ Summa theologiae, 1a, 2ae. 102, 6.Google Scholar