Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-g8jcs Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T16:22:11.010Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Discussion: Internal impediments

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2013

D. Goldstick
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Not everything that it's ‘possible’ FOR you to do is something it's ‘possible’ THAT you will do. The compatibilist freedom formula ‘absence of impediments’ must embrace external and internal – including psychological – impediments. Desires are impediments only when they impede, owing to motivational conflict. But other impediments, external or internal, require merely the potential to impede.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 88 , Issue 2 , April 2013 , pp. 313 - 315
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2013

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Hobbes, The Leviathan, chapter 21.

2 Frankfurt, Harry G., ‘Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person’, Journal of Philosophy 68 (1971), 5–20CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

3 See, e.g., Kane, Robert, ‘Two Kinds Of Incompatibilism’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (1989), 251–252CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Wolf, Susan, ‘Asymmetrical Freedom’, Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980), 156CrossRefGoogle Scholar.