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Definitions and Counter-examples

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

James Cargile
James Cargile
Affiliation:
University of Virginia
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Extract

In his paper ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, T. S. Kuhn asks: Ought we demand of our concepts, as we do of our laws and theories, that they be applicable to any and every situation that might conceivably arise in any possible world? Is it not sufficient to demand of a concept, as we do of a law or theory, that it be unequivocally applicable in every situation which we expect ever to encounter?

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 62 , Issue 240 , April 1987 , pp. 179 - 193
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1987

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References

1 T. S., Kuhn, ‘A Function for Thought Experiments’, in Hacking (ed.), Scientific Revolutions (Oxford University Press, 1981).Google Scholar