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The Concepts of the Sceptic: Transcendental Arguments and Other Minds

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

G. W. Smith
G. W. Smith
Affiliation:
University of Lancaster
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Extract

Strawson's attempt to refute scepticism about the existence of other minds has itself been a popular target of sceptical criticism. But the very persistence of the attacks suggests that no clinching rebuttal has yet been produced. One of the earliest and still one of the most effective responses to Strawson is Ayer's celebrated paper ‘The Concept of a Person’, in which he reasserts the position of classical empiricist scepticism on the existence of other minds. By reinterpreting and partly reconstructing Strawson's arguments I shall try to show that the sceptical position represented by Ayer is indeed incoherent, as Strawson maintains, and I shall suggest why a conclusive rebuttal of Strawson's anti-sceptical arguments has not been and is unlikely to be produced.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 49 , Issue 188 , April 1974 , pp. 149 - 168
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1974

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References

1 Strawson, P. F., Individuals (London, Methuen, 1959).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

2 Ayer, A. J., The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (London, Macmillan, 1964).Google Scholar

3 Stroud, B., ‘Transcendental Arguments’, Journal of Philosophy, LXV, No. 9, 1968.Google Scholar

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5 I owe this point to Professor F. N. Sibley.

6 See Ward, K., ‘The Ascription of Experiences’, Mind, LXXIX, 1970, pp. 415–420CrossRefGoogle Scholar, for a similar criticism.

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