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Comte's Positivism and the Science of Society1
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 February 2009
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Positivism is the view that the only way to obtain knowledge of the world is by means of sense perception and introspection and the methods of the empirical sciences. Positivists believe that it is futile to attempt to deduce or demonstrate truths about the world from alleged self-evident premisses that are not based primarily on sense perception. They consider, on the contrary, that knowledge of things can only be advanced by framing hypotheses, testing them by observation and experiment, and reshaping them in the light of what these reveal. Thus they regard metaphysics, in so far as it is the effort to find out about the world by methods other than those employed in the empirical sciences, as a hopelessly misdirected activity. The method of hypothesis, they hold, is applicable to any field of factual enquiry, although they admit that differences of subject-matter may call for very considerable variations of emphasis. Such variations, however, important though they be, are, on their view, matters of detail, and do not detract from the essential sameness of the effective method. This method was first consciously analysed by reference to the sciences of nature, where its use has led to impressive results both in the theoretical and practical sphere.
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- Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1951
References
page 292 note 1 Comte at one time “regretted the hybrid character” of this word, but later wrote: “but there is a compensation, as I reflected afterwards, for this etymological defect, in the fact that it recalls the two historical sources-the one intellectual, the other social-from which modern civilization has sprung.” System of Positive Polity (1851), vol. I, p. 326 (translated by Bridges, J. H.).Google Scholar
page 292 note 2 Plan des Travaux Scientifiques Nécessaires pour réorganiser la Société (Opuscules de Philosophie Sociale, Paris, 1883, pp. 100–101).Google Scholar
page 294 note 1 He refers to “le sage Hume” on a matter of history, and calls him “le judicieux Hume” in connection with his account of causality.
page 294 note 2 Discours sur l'Esprit Positif, § 12.
page 294 note 3 Diderot, , Oeuvres (Ed. Assézat, J.), I, pp. 304–305.Google Scholar
page 294 note 4 Traité des Sensations, 1754 edition, title to Part III. The matter is discussed by M. Le Roy in his edition of Condillac's philosophical works (1947).
page 295 note 1 Oeuvres Philosophiques (Ed. 1805), II, pp. 125–126.Google Scholar
page 295 note 2 Oeuvres (1808), III, pp. 138–154.Google Scholar
page 295 note 3 In a letter to Harriet Martineau (Auguste Comte, Littré, 1877, p. 642), Comte said this made him “insensible to the blows of an incompetent press.”
page 295 note 4 Gouhier, H., La Vie d'Auguste Comte (Paris, 1931)Google Scholar, and La Jeunesse d'Auguste Comte, Vol. I (Paris, 1933).Google Scholar
page 295 note 5 Discours sur l'Esprit Positif, § 34.
page 295 note 6 Le Bon sens, ou idées naturelles opposées aux idées surnaturelles. I quote from the London edition of 1774. The first edition was published at Amsterdam in 1772. It is not only the title of this book that appears to anticipate Comte's theories. In the Preface d'Holbach refers to “good sense” as “that portion of Judgment which suffices for the knowledge of the simplest truths, the rejection of the most striking absurdities...” (p. 1). Anyone who carefully consults good sense in the study of religious opinions “will easily see that these opinions have no solid foundations; that every religion is an edifice in the air; that Theology is only ignorance of natural causes reduced to system.” D'Holbach goes on to argue that at the beginning of history ferocious and warlike men imagined in their own image a God of Battles, served by priests who used religion to keep men subject to tyrants (p. vii). Instead of concerning themselves “with the natural and visible causes of their unhappiness,” men were “fascinated by religious notions or metaphysical fictions” (p. viii). All men, according to d'Holbach, have an interest in the truth, but such science as priests developed in early times they kept from the general run of men, or only imparted to them in allegories (p. 290). The general interest would be served if priests ceased discussing useless subtleties and helped on the advance of science (pp. 274–275). Apart from the notion of a good sense concerned with what is testable and useful, we can see in this book adumbrations of the Law of the Three Stages; theologians and metaphysicians are classed together and contrasted with “philosophers”; and the theological era is regarded as militaristic, and science as inclined towards peace.
page 297 note 1 Cours de Philosophic Positive, Vol. VI (Paris, 1842), pp. 705–710. The anticipation of Marxism is striking. Comte stresses the union of theory and practice, the special virtue of the proletariat, and the affinity between intellectuals and the working classes.Google Scholar
page 297 note 2 Les Sciences Sociales dans l'Encyclopédie (Paris, 1923).Google Scholar
page 300 note 1 Comte himself regarded a post-positive stage of knowledge as an “utopie trop extravagante pour mériter la moindre discussion.” Cours de Philosophie Positive, IV (1839), p. 174.Google Scholar
page 301 note 1 I have seen aspects of this question discussed in the following: Charner Perry, M., Knowledge as a Basis for Social Reform (International Journal of Ethics, Vol. XLV, No. 3, April 1935)Google Scholar. Knight, Frank H., Salvation by Science: The Gospel according to Professor Lundberg (The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LV, No. 6, Dec. 1947)Google Scholar. Otto, Neurath, Empirische Soziologie (Vienna, 1931).Google Scholar
page 302 note 1 Catéchisme Positiviste (1852). Third edition, Paris, 1890, p. 59.Google Scholar
page 303 note 1 VI, p. 863.
page 303 note 2 Cours de Philosophie Positive, VI, p. 599.Google Scholar
page 304 note 1 Auguste Comte. Littré, 1877, pp. 615–616.
page 304 note 2 Cours, IV (1839), pp. 310–311.Google Scholar
page 304 note 3 Cours, IV (1839), pp. 408–409.Google Scholar
page 304 note 4 Cours, IV, p. 176.Google Scholar
page 305 note 1 Cours, VI, p. 861.Google Scholar
page 305 note 2 System of Positive Polity (English trans., 1875), I, pp. 338–346.Google Scholar
page 305 note 3 Ibid., II, p. 352.
page 305 note 4 § 53.
page 305 note 5 System of Logic, VI, Ch. 12, § 6.
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