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Central State Materialism and Consciousness

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Richard H. Green
Richard H. Green
Affiliation:
Monash University
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 56 , Issue 215 , January 1981 , pp. 106 - 113
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1981

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References

1 Popper, Karl R. and Eccles, John C., The Self and the Brain (Berlin: Springer International, 1977), 72–75Google Scholar.

2 Op. cit., 81–88.

3 A similar argument has been put forward by Puccetti, Roland in ‘Is Pain Necessary?’, Philosophy 50 (1975)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Dennett, D. C., ‘Mechanism and Responsibility’, in Essays on Freedom of Action, Honderich, (ed.) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1973), 183Google Scholar.

5 Brandt, Richard B., ‘Doubts about the Identity Theory’, in Dimensions of Mind, by Hook, S. (ed.) (New York: Collier Books, 1961), 67Google Scholar.

6 Dualist Interactionism has recently been defended at length by Karl Popper and John Eccles in the book already cited.

7 H. S. Jennings, The Behaviour of the Lower Organisms.