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The Case for Time Travel

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2000

Abstract

This idea of time travel has long given philosophers difficulties. Most recently, in his paper ‘Troubles with Time Travel’ William Grey presents a number of objections to time travel, some well known in the philosophical literature, others quite novel. In particular Grey's ‘no destinations’ and ‘double occupation’ objections I take to be original, while what I will call the ‘times paradox’ and the ‘possibility restriction argument’ are versions of well known objections. I show how each of these can be answered, thereby defending the plausibility of time travel.

Type
Brief Report
Copyright
© The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2000

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