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Berkeley and the External World

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

J. A. Brunton
Affiliation:
University College, Cardiff

Extract

There are so many logical systems that it is difficult to find any criteria to which they must all conform. It is, however, generally agreed that all logical systems, however diverse in character, must avoid falling into contradiction. Internal consistency would, indeed, inevitably form part of any definition of what is meant by a logical system.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1953

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References

page 325 note 1 “A Pragmatic Conception of the Priori,” p. 287, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl and Sellars.

page 325 note 2 Principles of Human Knowledge, p. 125, Everyman Library.

page 329 note 1 “That unthinking things can exist absolutely.”

page 329 note 2 Chapter on “Berkeley,” History of Western Philosophy.

page 329 note 3 “That the absolute existence of unthinking things are words without a meaning or which include a contradiction.”

page 330 note 1 .Mind, July 1950. “Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements.”

page 331 note 1 Berkeley, it will be remembered, says that when we talk of absent objects we tacitly introduce an imagined observer.

page 332 note 1 I would like to stress here the word “able.” Our imagining is far more a dispositional matter, far less an entertaining of concrete images than some Empiricists have realized. Hume, however, realized well enough that words like “government” are not entertained through images but are at the best cashable in terms of them.

page 333 note 1 Berkeley, pp. 127–8, Leaders of Philosophy Series.

page 334 note 1 “Meaning and Verification,” p. 169, Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl and Sellars.

page 335 note 1 “The Reputation of Realism,” Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl and Sellars.

page 337 note 1 Page 678.

page 337 note 2 Berkeley's argument about Material Substance,” Proceedings of the British Academy, p. 127, Vol. xxviii. 1942.Google Scholar

page 340 note 1 Op. cit.