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Before the Mereological Fallacy: A Rejoinder to Rom Harré

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 January 2013

P. M. S. Hacker
P. M. S. Hacker*
Affiliation:
St John's College, Oxford
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Information
Philosophy , Volume 88 , Issue 1 , January 2013 , pp. 141 - 148
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2013

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References

1 Harré, ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, Philosophy 85 (2012), 352.

2 Bennett, M. R. and Hacker, P. M. S., Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience (Blackwell, Oxford, 2003)Google Scholar, 73.

3 Searle, J. R., ‘Putting Consciousness back in the Brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker’, in Bennett, M., Dennett, D., Hacker, P. and Searle, J., Neuroscience and Philosophy: Mind, Brain, and Language (Columbia University Press, New York, 2007)Google Scholar, 107.

4 We replied in Neuroscience and Philosophy, 133–5.

5 The Physical Basis of Mind, 441.

6 I have elaborated this distinction, which is crucial for the resolution of the mind/body problem, in Human Nature: the Categorial Framework (Blackwell, Oxford, 2007)Google Scholar, ch. 9.

7 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 338.

8 ‘Behind the Mereological Fallacy’, 350.

9 Rather surprisingly, Harré says that organs are substances (337). But this is mistaken. A functional part of a living substance is not itself a substance. For elaboration, see Human Nature: the Categorial Framework, 42–5.

10 See von Wright, G. H., The Varieties of Goodness (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1963)Google Scholar, III – 8.