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Austin's ‘Philosophical Papers’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Alice Ambrose
Affiliation:
Smith College, Northampton, Mass.

Extract

The essays collected in this volume, appearing between the years 1939 and 1958, include all of the late Professor J. L. Austin's published papers, and in addition two unpublished papers, ‘The Meaning of a Word’ (1940) and ‘Unfair to Facts’ (1954), as well as an unscripted talk, ‘Performative Utterances’, given in the Third Programme of the B.B.C. in 1956. The editors, J. O. Urmson and G. J. Warnock, have performed a real service in making these papers available in one volume; for the cumulative impact of the method Austin pursued in doing philosophy, and the questions this method raises, can be felt and appreciated more fully when a considerable assemblage of illustrative papers is brought together. The debt Austin owes to the tradition to which G. E. Moore and Wittgenstein contributed is quite clear, and the divergences from them are equally clear. In reviewing the contents of the ten articles in this volume I shall try to single out what is unique about his contribution, in particular what features of his procedure, falling as it does under the general classification ‘linguistic analysis’, were so distinctive as to win for it the attention accorded to a new departure.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1963

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References

page 201 note 1 Philosophical Papers. By Austin, J. L.. Editors Urmson, J. O. and Warnock, G. J.. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1961. Pp. 239. Price 25s.Google Scholar

page 204 note 1 Of course universals are not confined to characterising sensuous things.

page 206 note 1 Although in the course of his discussion he seems to imply that ‘part of the meaning of a word’ has no sense: ‘… we do not know what it means at all…’ (p. 31).Google Scholar

page 211 note 1 Though he allowed that one does something more thereby—one ‘confirms’ or ‘grants’ it.Google Scholar

page 212 note 1 It is of interest that in the most recently published work of Austin, How to Do Things with Words (1962), he seems to disclaim the possibility of making any sharp distinction between the two sorts of utterances. Every genuine speech-act is admitted to have features of both kinds. See especially pp. 144, 145, 146.Google Scholar

page 213 note 1 Pnc. Arist. Soc, Suppl. Vol. XX, p. 188.Google Scholar

page 215 note 1 Philosophical Investigations, p. 221.Google Scholar

page 216 note 1 Ibid., sec. 257-58.