Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-4rdpn Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-02T19:31:47.269Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Animals and Morals*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Roslind Godlovitch
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Extract

In the following paper, I will be operating within the framework of moral concepts set out by R. M. Hare in his Language of Morals and Freedom and Reason. Using this framework, I shall attempt to show that (a) if we claim that certain attitudes we have toward animals are moral, then the application of the consequences of these principles leads us into a rather bizarre, if not outlandish, position, which few would accept as prima facie moral; and (b) if we adopt what can be accepted as a truly moral position with respect to animals, this will turn out to be indistinguishable in kind, if not in degree, from our morality with respect to humans.

Type
Articles
Information
Philosophy , Volume 46 , Issue 175 , January 1971 , pp. 23 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1971

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Hart, H. L. A., ‘Are There any Natural Rights?’ in Quinton, (ed.), Political Philosophy, pp. 53/4.Google Scholar

2 We might refer to this type of obligation as that of an Other-based principle; it arises out of consideration of other individuals. This can be contrasted with Ideal-based principles such as those which prescribe what should be done for personal happiness or for the realization of some personal ideal. As Hart points out, the classical Greek codes can be interpreted in this way.

A principle that deliberately excludes from consideration (or simply fails to consider) a certain set of individuals can be referred to as a Restricted Other-based principle. It would appear that Hart's version of natural rights is, as it stands, a Restricted Other-based principle.

3 If we do interpret P1 in such a way that it justified sacrificing animals in the interest of humans, then we are left in the embarrassing position of supporting the sacrifice of a minority of innocent humans for the same purpose.

4 I am considering ‘not causing suffering’ and ‘preventing suffering’ as paradigms. Concepts like ‘gross negligence’ indicate that the distinction is not a clear one. But the consequences of not-P2 and P3 are not affected by this consideration.

5 The issues involved in euthanasia make this point clear. The dilemma can be crudely stated as weighing the value placed on living up against the negative value of suffering. Since we place a very great value on human life the problem of euthanasia concerns itself with cases in which the suffering is extremely prolonged or intense or intolerable. The lower the value placed on life the less severe need be the suffering in order for it be justified to take the life (provided, of course, the negative value placed on suffering remains). When the moral value placed on life is zero, as a rejection of P2 would indicate that it is with animals, any amount of suffering would be sufficient to render obligatory taking the animal's life in order to prevent the suffering.

6 There may be aesthetic considerations in favour of culling rather than total eradication, just as pruning a tree may have a more beautiful outcome than cutting it down. But this is to resign from a consideration of animals as moral subjects altogether, and the arguments offered by hunters are put forward as moral arguments.