^{page 82 note 1} Pp. 21–2.

^{page 82 note 2} Pp. 140 ff.

^{page 83 note 1} P. 18.

^{page 83 note 2} He thinks that better rules of syntax will “automatically” prevent nonsense; p. 170.

^{page 83 note 3} P. 24.

^{page 83 note 4} Pp. 112–13.

^{page 84 note 1} Indeed he seems anxious to avoid any kind of ego. He says (p. 230): “Thus ‘I am hot’ means ‘hotness is a member of the awareness-family of this, and is compresent with this’.”

^{page 84 note 2} His failure to examine the aesthetic use of language in this connection leads him to assert that “the play Hamlet consists entirely of false propositions.”

^{page 84 note 3} Pp. 12 ff. See also pp. 117 and 131.

^{page 85 note 1} P. 188; but on p. 189 we are told that propositions are to be defined as psychological occurrences—complex images, expectations, etc.

^{page 85 note 2} P. 193. Mr. Russell is “not quite satisfied” that this causal definition is adequate.

^{page 85 note 3} P. 285. Similarly on p. 339, “The physical and physiological causation of percepts compels us to regard them as all in one region, which must be inside the percipient's head.”

^{page 85 note 4} P. 296.

^{page 85 note 5} See, for instance, pp. 313, 247, 291, 297.

^{page 85 note 6} P. 232.