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Against Non-Comparabilism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 February 2009

Robin Attfield
Affiliation:
University College, Cardiff

Abstract

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Type
Discussion
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1975

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References

1 This is the view, for example, of Phillips, D. Z. and Mounce, H. O., Moral Practices (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970)Google Scholar (see e.g. pp. 59 and 70), and of Beardsmore, R. W., Moral Reasoning (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) (chapters 4, 5 and 9, passim).Google Scholar

2 I have discussed some of these issues elsewhere: see ‘The Logical Status of Moral Utterances’, Journal of Critical Analysis, IV, No. 2, 01 1972, pp. 7084Google Scholar; ‘Towards a Defence of Teleology’, Ethics, 85, No. 2, 01 1975Google Scholar; ‘On Being Human’, Inquiry, 17, 1974, pp. 175192.Google Scholar