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Universal Moral Standards and the Problem of Cultural Relativism in Hume's ‘A Dialogue’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 August 2013

Henrik Bohlin
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Abstract

An interpretation and critical re-construction is offered of David Hume's argument on cultural relativism in the essay ‘A Dialogue’ (1751). For any issue of moral disagreement, Hume contends, either one side can be shown right and the other wrong, or imprecision in moral principles leaves room for more than one reasonable view, or the disagreement concerns a morally indifferent aesthetic matter, or it is caused by ‘artificial’ moral sentiments. In each case, relativism is the wrong view. Following an analysis of each disagreement type, and the crucial notion of ‘artificial’ views, it is concluded that Hume's anti-relativist argument is sound.

Type
Research Article
Information
Philosophy , Volume 88 , Issue 4 , October 2013 , pp. 593 - 606
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2013 

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