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Two Theories of Civilization

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2009

Jay Newman
Affiliation:
University of Guelph

Extract

Once upon a time, when there was no psychoanalysis or cultural anthro-pology or meta-ethics, most philosophers believed that there was objective truth in such statements as, ‘Murder is wrong’, ‘One should not steal’, and ‘Heliogabalus was an evil man’. Many philosophers still believe that there is, and though their view is not wholly respectable in most English-speaking philosophical circles, it probably has the important merit of being true. There are serious reasons for worrying about the traditional view: it is not clear how an ‘ought’ can be derived from an ‘is’; there are problems s e in trying to translate evaluative terms into descriptive ones; reflective men disagree profoundly on ethical issues; ethical judgments appear to have an emotive component; etc. Still, there are also very good reasons for believing that murder is wrong and that Heliogabalus was an evil man. I shall not defend the objectivity of statements of the form, ‘X is good (bad, evil, right, wrong)’, for I am not at all worried about such statements passing out of the language of rational men. Even behaviourists and relativists and emotivists still make reasonably intelligent statements of this form. But I am worried about the future of a related class of statements, those of the form, ‘X is civilized (barbarous)’. These statements have been gradually disappearing from our discourse; perhaps they have been casualties of recent revolutions in social science and philosophy. And this state of affairs is a tragic one indeed, for not only is there a need for statements of this form, but of all ethical statements, these are the ones whose descriptive content is most incontrovertible. Non-cognitivistic moral philosophers generally dismiss statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ along with statements about the ‘good’, ‘evil’, ‘right’, and ‘wrong’. But social scientists have made statements about the ‘civilized’ and ‘barbarous’ special objects of attack. They have even suggested that people who make such statements are narrow-minded, naive, and ‘ethnocentric’. ‘Ethnocentrism’, an eminent social scientist tells us, ‘is the technical name for this view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it.’ Ethnocentrism is innocent enough up to a point, but reflective men should be careful not to allow it to blind their moral sense. The noted anthropologist, Herskovits, has given us the following warning:

Cultures are sometimes evaluated by the use of the designations ‘civilized’ and ‘primitive’. These terms have a deceptive simplicity, and attempts to document the differences implied in them have proved to be of unexpected difficulty.

Type
Articles
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 1979

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References

1 Sumner, William Graham, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940 [1906]), 13.Google Scholar

2 Herskovits, Melville J., Man and His Works (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964 [1948]), 71.Google Scholar

3 Toynbee, A. J., A Study of History, Vol. V (London: Oxford University Press, 1939), 482.Google Scholar

4 Herskovits, , p. 72.Google Scholar

5 Newman, John Henry, ‘Lectures on the History of the Turks, in Their Relation to Europe’, in Historical Sketches, Vol. I (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1908), 163Google Scholar. This work will be referred to in the text as LHT.

6 Newman's many references to ordinary language represent an important and often neglected aspect of his philosophical method.

7 ‘All that need be said in favour of the Czar is, that he is attacking an infamous Power, the enemy of God and man…. It is difficult to understand how a reader of history can side with the Spanish people in past centuries in their struggle with the Moors, without wishing Godspeed, in mere consistency, to any Christian Power, which aims at delivering the East of Europe from the Turkish yoke’ (LHT, xii).

8 Collingwood, R. G., An Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press, 1939)Google Scholar; An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940)Google Scholar; The New Leviathan (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1942)Google Scholar; ‘Fascism and Nazism’, Philosophy 15 (1940), 168176.Google Scholar

9 Collingwood, , The New Leviathan, 280, 289Google Scholar. This work will be referred to in the text as NL.

10 Collingwood, , An Essay on Metaphysics, 139140, 223227.Google Scholar

11 Newman's contribution to the study of history is discussed in Thomas S. Bokenkotter, Cardinal Newman as an Historian (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1959). Collingwood was not only an outstanding philosopher of history but a distinguished intellectual historian and authority on Roman Britain.